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4Abstract
Arguably, the emotions elicited by playing are the reason why people play digital
games. Social interaction is an important source of emotion during game play,
but research on it is rather sparse. In this dissertation I briefly review the
emotion-theoretic literature in order to better understand what emotion means
in the context of games, and how this should be taken into account when
measuring emotions related to a game experience. Study I presents a review of
the use of psychophysiological methods in game research. I show that the
theoretical background behind these methods generally tends to be neglected.
This could be remedied by a theoretical framework that integrates the
understanding of emotions and explicitly describes the links between different
emotion measures and the theoretical concepts they are professed to reflect. I
present my proposition for the first step towards such a framework in Study II.
I employ the sociality characteristics framework by de Kort and IJsselsteijn
(2008) and my interpretation of the social factors in order to study the effect of
the central social context factors on the emotional game experience. Study III
presents evidence that in addition to tonic physiological levels, the relationship
between the participants also affects the momentary, phasic responses to the
key game events—victory and defeat. In particular, although physiological
signals can, to a certain extent, be used to assess emotional experiences (such as
positive responses to a victory), in some cases the typical psychophysiological
mappings may even be completely opposite. Interpreting these signals requires
a broader theoretical understanding than what is typically acknowledged. Study
IV supports the earlier findings that competition is experienced more positively
than cooperation—but that the effect is dependent on gender, as this was found
only in males. For females, there was no difference between the two modes, and
no difference in negative activation. In addition, self-reports concerning social
presence suggested that this concept is not always associated with higher
positive emotions, while a form of friendly rivalry (associated with lower social
presence) might be experienced positively—a finding apparently new in existing
literature. Finally, Study V provides insight into the practical significance of the
measurements with a predictive validity study, showing practical effects how the
5certain kinds of game experiences may lead to greater game use and preference,
but that these links are not as simple as previously suggested.
In sum, this work offers new knowledge on how social context factors are
generally related to the game experience, on how emotions can be studied in
game research and what theoretical considerations should be taken into
account, and on the emotional effects of particular social context factors during
play. The results are mainly useful for further basic game research, but they
have also potential implications for general emotion research, the game
industry, and in the long run, society at large.
6Tiivistelmä
Digitaalisten pelien herättämiä tunnekokemuksia on pidetty tärkeänä
selittäjänä näiden suosiolle. Sosiaalinen vuorovaikutus pelin aikana taas on
merkittävä tunnekokemuksien lähde, mutta sitä on tutkittu melko vähän. Tässä
väitöskirjassa käyn osaksi läpi tunteita selittävää emootioteoriakirjallisuutta
tarkastellakseni mitä tunteen tai emootion käsite tarkoittaa pelikontekstissa ja
kuinka tämä tieto tulisi ottaa huomioon kun tunnekokemusta halutaan mitata
pelitutkimuksessa. Tutkimus I esittää katsauksen psykofysiologisten
menetelmien käytöstä pelitutkimuksessa, jonka avulla osoitan kuinka näiden
menetelmien taustalla oleva teoreettinen perusta jätetään usein huomiotta.
Tähän tyypilliseen puutteeseen olisi avuksi kokonaisvaltainen teoreettinen
emootioiden ja niiden mittaamisen viitekehys. Esitän oman ehdotukseni
kyseisenlaisen viitekehyksen suuntaan Tutkimuksessa II.
Käytän tutkimukseni empiirisessä osuudessa tulkintaani de Kortin ja
IJsselsteijnin (2008) teoreettisesta viitekehyksestä sosiaalisuuspiirteistä
tutkiakseni merkittävien sosiaalisten tekijöiden merkitystä pelaamisen
tunnekokemukselle. Tutkimuksessa III esitän todisteita, että pelaajien väliset
suhteet vaikuttavat pitkien jaksojen keskiarvojen lisäksi myös yksittäisten
tilanteiden—voiton ja häviön—laukaisemiin hetkellisiin reaktioihin. Tulokset
osoittavat kuitenkin, että joissain tilanteissa reaktiot voivat olla
odottamattomat, minkä vuoksi fysiologisten mittausten tulkinnassa tulisi
käyttää laajempaa teoreettista ymmärrystä kuin on yleistä. Tutkimus IV:n
tulokset tukevat aiempia löydöksiä, että peleissä kilpailu koetaan
positiivisemmin kuin yhteistyö, mutta että tämä vaikutus riippuu sukupuolesta:
tulos pätee vain miehiin, kun taas naiset eivät osoittaneet eroa näiden
pelimuotojen välillä positiivisen eivätkä negatiivisen tunnereaktion suhteen.
Lisäksi huomattiin, että sosiaalisen läsnäolon kokemuksella, joka on yleensä
yhdistetty positiiviseen kokemukseen, ei ole selvää yhteyttä positiivisuuteen,
kun taas emootiokirjallisuudessa esitetyn selityksen vastaisesti tietynlainen
ystävällismielinen vahingonilo voidaan kokea positiivisena. Lopuksi, Tutkimus
V esittää kuinka emootiomittauksilla voi olla käytännöllistä ennustevaliditeettia,
missä tietynlaiset pelikokemukset voidaan yhdistää tulevaan
7pelikäyttäytymiseen, mutta että nämä yhteydet eivät ole niin yksinkertaisia kuin
on aiemmin esitetty.
Yhteenvetona, työni tarjoaa uutta tietoa siitä, mikä on sosiaalisten
taustatekijöiden yleinen yhteys pelikokemukseen, kuinka emootioita voidaan
tarkastella pelitutkimuksessa ja mitä teoreettisia näkökohtia tällöin tulisi ottaa
huomioon, sekä siitä mitä ovat tiettyjen sosiaalisten taustatekijöiden
emootiovaikutus pelikokemuksen aikana. Työn tuloksia voidaan käyttää lähinnä
pelaamisen perustutkimuksessa, mutta niillä on myös mahdollista merkitystä
yleisessä emootiotutkimuksessa, pelitutkimuksen käytännöllisessä
soveltamisessa peliteollisuuden hyödyksi, sekä pitkällä aikavälillä myös
laajempien yhteiskunnallisten kysymysten kannalta.
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Abbreviations and glossary
Abbr. Unabbreviated Description
EMG Electromyography Physiological measurement of muscle
activity; in this work, particularly facial
muscles: ZM, CS, OO.
ZM Zygomaticus major Cheek muscle group; used in smiling.
CS Corrugator supercilii Brow muscle; used in frowning.
OO Orbicularis oculi Muscles around the eyes; used in narrowing
the eyes.
EDA Electrodermal
activity
Physiological measurements of skin
conductance (SC); in this work, especially SC
level.
SCL Skin conductance
level
EDA measurement where all the skin
conductance activity is aggregated over a
period of time.
HR Heart rate Physiological measurement of how often the
heart beats.
FPS First-person shooter A digital game type where the game world is
viewed from the eyes of the game character.
Originally and typically these games have
been shooting games.
AI Artificial intelligence In games, the artificial intelligence controlling
game characters (in contrast to the entire
game environment) in response to the
player’s actions.
- Phasic physiological
responses
Momentary physiological responses, typically
elicited by a specific event in the stimulus.
The “average response” to an event.
- Tonic physiological
responses
The averaged activity levels during a period of
time, such as one experimental condition. The
“average state” of the signal over that period.
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1. Introduction
In a couple of decades, digital games1 have risen from the position of children’s
toys of limited commercial and cultural significance to worldwide popularity.
According to the US industry, more than half of the population of the US plays
digital games (Entertainment Software Association, 2014) and the figures are
similar in Finland (Kallio, Mäyrä, & Kaipainen, 2009). In addition to
entertainment, games are used for many other purposes: for example, for
education (Pivec & Pivec, 2011), therapy (Kharrazi, Lu, Gharghabi, & Coleman,
2012; B. Ferguson, 2012), crowdsourcing scientific calculation (Coren & Fast
Company, 2011), and persuasion (e.g., helping to switch to healthier living
habits; Valdivieso-López et al., 2013). Although digital games still have an
ambivalent public image, they are now an integral part of our popular culture.
Relative to their importance in people’s lives today, the psychology behind
playing digital games is still relatively poorly understood. What is it in the
feeling of playing games that attracts so many people? The psychology of games
and gaming is important for learning how the playing is experienced
(understanding the immediate effects playing has), how it affects the players in
the longer run (the potential adverse and beneficial effects that affect the
player’s life outside the play), and why people play and how this knowledge can
be used in design of further entertainment and serious applications (see e.g.,
Marczewski, 2013).
The present dissertation contributes to the basic research of how games are
experienced at the moment of playing, to the theory of what such a phenomenon
1  For the purposes of this study an exact definition for ‘game’ is not important; see Salen and
Zimmerman (2004, Chapter 7) for a discussion on defining ‘games’ and ‘play’.
I use the term ‘digital games’ to refer to any software commonly identified as games, regardless of the
hardware running it. That covers common entertainment games readily available in modern Western
popular culture and played on PCs, dedicated game consoles, tablets, and smartphones, but I see no reason
to exclude serious games, games that have no video output, or software toys that lack many characteristics
of games. I prefer ‘digital games’, because the commonly used alternatives, namely ‘video games’ and
‘computer games’, can be confusing as for long time they have been used in different contexts to cover
either all (or nearly all) digital games or only games run on a particular platform (‘video games’ covering
only console games and ‘computer games’ only games on PCs). ‘Electronic games’ would cover largely as
broad set as ‘digital games’ without the abovementioned confusion, but I remember hearing that word the
first time in my childhood in the 80’s to refer to early monochrome handheld game consoles dedicated to a
single game like Donkey Kong, which sounds too outdated.
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is, and to the methodology of how it can be studied. Due to this broad focus, its
contents are likely to be relevant also for purposes outside game research.
***
Digital games are played largely due to the emotions they elicit (Oliver & Raney,
2011; Fang, Chan, Brzezinski, & Nair, 2010; Caroux, Isbister, Le Bigot, & Vibert,
2015). Fun or enjoyment are often cited as an experience that people seek from
game play (Tamborini, Bowman, Eden, Grizzard, & Organ, 2010; Yannakakis &
Hallam, 2008), and states like flow, engagement, or involvement
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1991; Caroux et al., 2015) that are often linked to games are
considered deeply emotional or are assumed to be a source of positive emotional
experiences (Nacke & Lindley, 2008; Brown & Cairns, 2004). Intrinsic
motivation—the motivation to do something because of the activity itself,
because it is enjoyable or satisfying, as opposed to doing it for some outside
benefits—is typically cited when explaining the pull of digital games (Ryan &
Deci, 2000; Wang, Khoo, Liu, & Divaharan, 2008; Tamborini et al., 2010; Ryan,
Rigby, & Przybylski, 2006). A similar idea is also present in consumer research,
where games are understood as “hedonic products” (Holbrook, Chestnut, Oliva,
& Greenleaf, 1984): things that are consumed because of the positive feelings
they elicit (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982; see Alba & Williams, 2013, for a
current review on hedonic consumption). If one wants to understand the digital
game experience2, one should study the emotions occurring during it.
Social interaction is an important factor often mentioned to contribute to the
motivation to play, and presumably, to the emotional experience of playing
digital games (Cole & Griffiths, 2007; Kallio et al., 2009; Raney, Smith, & Baker,
2006; Jansz & Tanis, 2007). Yet for long, most game research focusing on the
game experience focused on the single-player experience (e.g., Klimmt,
Hartmann, & Frey, 2007; Mandryk, Inkpen, & Calvert, 2006; Cowley, Charles,
2 Other terms used with roughly the same meaning include player experience, play experience, and
gameplay experience, depending on what the author wishes to emphasize. My (ultimately a somewhat
arbitrary) choice is ’digital game experience’, because although the ’player experience’ more accurately
expresses exactly the fact that the experience is not a product of the game only, it remains ambiguous on
which kind of play it talks about (children’s pretend play? theatric play? tabletop or live-action role-play?).
In my opinion, it is better to start with a relatively strict term, and when necessary, clarify that this covers
the whole experience related to playing a digital game. For practical reasons, the term gets shortened to
’game experience’ in most cases.
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Black, & Hickey, 2008; see also Caroux et al., 2015), and the rare exceptions
that seriously considered the social aspect (e.g., Sweetser & Wyeth, 2005) did
not gain wide support in game research (although neither did any other—to this
day, the game experience research lacks a widely established theoretical
framework). After the rise of massively multiplayer online (MMO) gaming,
scholars began investigating why people play online games (Yee, 2006; Cole &
Griffiths, 2007; Frostling-Henningsson, 2009; Billieux & Linden, 2013). Being
about multiplayer games, these studies consistently acknowledged that the
social aspect is one of the main attractions in these games (see also, e.g.,
“relatedness” in Tamborini et al., 2010). But this research ignores two important
points. First, most of these studies have been focused on the game play as a
hobby or an activity, ignoring the game experience at the moment of play.
Second, the focus on online multiplayer games ignores that a lot of social play
occurs locally, in the same room with other people—for example, when a child
and an adult or friends play together rather to be with other people than for the
game itself (Kallio, Mäyrä, & Kaipainen, 2010). This second oversight was noted
by de Kort and IJsselsteijn (2008), who presented a research framework of
“sociality characteristics” that affect the game experience in addition to the
objective characteristics of the game itself. According to this framework, the
players’ emotional responses to game play would be heavily influenced by the
social context, that is, factors such as who you are playing with, how and how
much do you get information from them, how you are physically situated in
relation to each other, and so on.
***
The aim of this dissertation is to understand better the emotions of a digital
game experience during local social game play. I have two approaches. On one
hand, I use the sociality characteristics framework to identify (some of the)
important social factors that affect the emotional game experience, and
investigate those factors experimentally. I focus on the local (i.e., not online)
social factors, because despite their importance, they have garnered less
attention than online sociality. On the other hand, I take a critical look at
measuring emotions and assess current common emotion measurement
methods in relation to emotion theories, in order to improve the understanding
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of the measures and the theoretical constructs they are presumed to correspond
to. Because of the ubiquity of emotions and neighboring concepts and
frameworks (e.g., motivation, mood management) in game research literature, I
focus on emotions as they are understood in psychological theories of emotion.
In the empirical articles, I use both self-report and psychophysiological
measurements, and in the discussion of this dissertation, I apply the results
from the critical approach to reframe the empirical results in light of the
broader theoretical understanding.
The research questions for this dissertation are the following.
1. How should emotions be understood and measured (in game research)?
Everyone thinks they know what emotions are because they experience them
daily. But as I will show, the concept of emotion is not clear, and measuring
them is even less so. I argue that the field needs a more critical look at the
measures, and a theoretical framework that offers a more multifaceted view on
emotions, and I offer the first version of such a framework.
2. How do certain social context factors affect the (emotional) game
experience? Some previous results exist, but the evidence is scarce and
conflicting, and it routinely does not take into account the theoretical
constraints of measuring emotions. I show the relationship of my empirical
investigations to earlier studies in regard to the factors identified within the
sociality characteristics model, and I build my experiments on the existing
empirical knowledge on those factors. In addition, I use the newly created
emotion-theoretical framework to make new interpretations of the empirical
results.
The contents of the introduction proceed as follows. In section 1.1, I review
the sociality characteristics framework and the current empirical research on
contextual factors. While reviewing the existing studies I use the word ‘emotion’
and related terms in the way they are used in these studies; after that, I take a
look at the concept closer in section 1.2. I briefly review the current theoretical
understanding of emotions and describe the common methods of measuring
them in the game research field. At the end, I take a critical look at what it
means to measure emotions. Before moving on to the sections covering the
methods and results of this work, I reiterate my aims.
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1.1. Social context in digital games
As mentioned, social interaction is an important factor in why people play (Cole
& Griffiths, 2007; Kallio et al., 2009; Raney et al., 2006; Jansz & Tanis, 2007).
What kind of factors make up the social context?
Although de Kort and IJsselsteijn (2008) most concretely discussed the
influence of contextual factors involved in a digital game experience, other
scholars had recognized something similar, especially on the cultural research
or humanistic side of the game research field. Mäyrä (2007)3 proposed that
besides the game experience itself, researchers should look at the immediate
personal and social contexts, the cultural game and play context and the context
of the game’s producers, and the wider context of social norms and values.
While relevant and thoughtful suggestions, the proposed contextual game
experience model was very abstract, without a more fine-grained structure for
what comprises these contexts. A more current account, the contextual
gameplay experience model by Engl and Nacke (2013) also operates on a very
abstract level, and while the article discusses a spatial factor investigated in an
empirical experiment, the social factors are not discussed.4 In contrast, Christou
and others (Christou, Law, Zaphiris, & Ang, 2013), Kultima and Stenros (2010),
and Sweetser, Johnson, and Wyeth (2012) had a more practical approach,
making concrete suggestions for designers. The aim for a direct applicability is
recommendable, but as the focus is in guidelines for design, the use for research
is not easy.
Considering the alternatives, the sociality characteristics model by de Kort &
IJsselsteijn seems to be the least abstract and to have the most potential for
3 Even further back, in their influential book, Salen and Zimmerman (2004) discussed both the game
boundaries (what is and is not part of the game?) and the social (and cultural) aspect extensively. In fact,
the concept of “magic circle”—that Salen and Zimmerman brought to academic attention (Huizinga,
1949)—is to this day widely discussed in humanistic/cultural game studies, debating the context of play as
a central question (Stenros, 2014). In contrast to game research, as I have used the term in this work, the
broader game studies field is not focusing exclusively on digital games, but include all kinds of games
(board games, tabletop and live-action role-playing games, etc.). Without the digital computer to set some
hard limits, the concept is certainly much more relevant than in digital games. The literature in the broader
game studies field on the topic is so large that I do not even attempt to approach it. In this dissertation, I
focus on digital games and their context, and consider only works that have studied the topic within the
digital game research literature.
4 A possible further contender is the integrated model of player experience (Elson, Breuer, & Quandt,
2014), which explicitly recognizes the play context as a third important aspect in addition to player and
medium, but I did not have access to it at the time of writing.
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practical use when considering empirical and experimental research of the
context factors related to the game experience.
1.1.1. Sociality characteristics framework and model
De Kort & IJsselsteijn’s work (2008) stemmed from the recognition that social
play is more common than assumed: even in supposedly solitary play, many
people play together by watching others play, commenting, and sharing the
emotional experience the social interaction. In addition, the game experience
was often seen as an interaction between the player and the game, with little
attention paid to the context in which the play occurred (Klimmt, 2003; Cowley,
Charles, Black, & Hickey, 2006). De Kort and IJsselsteijn state:
“Our work is strongly inspired by the realisation that gaming is often as much
about social interaction, as it is about interaction with the game content.
Thus, the rich interactive experiences associated with gaming can only be
fully understood when the game is conceptualised as more than the software
and hardware one is interacting with locally, but includes a larger situational
perspective, tapping in on the social-contextual contingencies that powerfully
influence game interactions and associated experiences.” (2008, p. 2)
The sociality characteristics framework (de Kort & IJsselsteijn, 2008) focuses
on social affordances that the game, the game interface, and the setting create in
a playing situation, and how they affect the game experience. In brief, the
sociality characteristics are the features of the setting that shape the situation in
a way that change how the people in the setting are aware of and can
communicate and interact with each other. As de Kort and IJsselsteijn put it,
the mere presence of another player does not influence the experience, as it
depends on the player’s ability to monitor it: if the physical, digital, or social
features do not allow the player to recognize or even suspect that there is a co-
player (e.g., in a psychological experiment where the player is told that the other
character is player by the AI), obviously the mediated presence of that person
cannot influence the social experience5. The result of the monitoring of all the
social cues is the (sense of) social presence: the experience of being with
5 Of course, there might be other differences that may influence the experience, such as different play
style or performance than an AI might have, but the argument here is about the mere presence.
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another, as defined by the original presenters of the concept (Biocca, Harms, &
Burgoon, 2003). However, social presence is not supposed to represent simply
the extent to which the participant has recognized the presence of another, but
also “psychological involvement with another intelligence and behavioural
engagement through interaction and synchronisation” (de Kort & IJsselsteijn,
2008, p. 6). Therefore, it is the result of detecting the social cues, but it also
itself affects the game experience directly by virtue of being itself a positive
experience6, and further indirectly by moderating the effects of the social factors
(i.e., they have less influence if the player is not involved with the other people).
(Regarding this, the model in Figure 1 is a bit misleading: social presence is not
meant to mediate the social context effects, as can be interpreted from the
figure, but only to moderate them.)
It is notable that by explicating processes like social facilitation and
emotional contagion as parts of social presence, de Kort and IJsselsteijn define
its mechanisms largely as emotional. This shows also in the composition of the
questionnaire they created for measuring social presence, which has subscales
of empathy and negative feelings, in addition to behavioral mimicry (Social
6 Although this ignores the fact that the presence of others—such as an annoying person—is not always
positive.
Figure 1. Framework for game settings’ sociality characteristics for game experience, by de Kort
and IJsselsteijn (2008). © Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. Reprinted by permission.
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Presence in Gaming Questionnaire; de Kort, IJsselsteijn, & Poels, 2007).
Although de Kort and IJsselsteijn give examples of possible mechanisms and
talk about what kind of things might be relevant, they do not offer a systematic
model that would explicitly state what the parts are and what are their
relationships to each other. In order to empirically study the social context
factors, it would be necessary to explicate what they might be. Interpreting de
Kort and IJsselsteijn’s (2008) social characteristics framework as it has been
described, I have derived that the factors could be broken into three context
factors7  (see Figure 2): (1) the physical and digital8 features of the setting, (2)
the presence and the type of presence of others, and (3) their relation to the
player in the play situation (roles) and outside it (relationships).
The first factor covers the social affordances, or the opportunities the
situation provides for monitoring the others and their actions, and for verbal
and non-verbal communication. How the second factor is experienced
depending on the first—how the experience of other’s presence is affected by the
physical and digital features of the setting—is in essence what is described in
Figure 1. The physical and virtual features of the setting refer to things like how
the participants are physically situated in relation to each other, can they see
7 Sets of factors really, but I talk about factors for convenience’s sake.
8 By ’digital’, I mean the features of the software—the game, the operating system, and other programs
possibly influencing the social situation—as an distinction from the physical features such as the
interpersonal distance and the body orientation of the participating persons.
Figure  2. Interpretation of the three social context factors in the sociality characteristics
framework.
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each other easily while playing, how the players are represented in the game,
and what are the concrete methods of communication. In addition to enabling
communication and monitoring of social cues, the digital features also define
much of the roles between the participants (specifically, the roles between the
players within the game, but not of the audience). And of course, a great portion
of the game experience—is it fun to play?—depends on the game, including how
the multiplayer features are implemented: is it fun to play together? and also, is
it fun to watch?
The second factor, presence of others, covers whether and how many others
are present, and how they are present. De Kort and IJsselsteijn divide the types
of presence into three categories that are intertwined with the physical and
virtual features: local co-presence (being physically located next to each other),
mediated co-presence (being physically apart but present in the game, and
possibly able to communicate by, e.g., an audio connection, but at the least by
some kind of player representation in the game), and virtual co-presence (an AI
co-presence; i.e., no other human present)9. The social presence within all these
categories may vary according to the physical, but also the virtual setting, so
that co-located situations, despite in principle allowing more direct
communication, are not always experienced as more social. For example, if the
digital features separate the players within the game world and do not give any
incentive to interact (e.g., shooting the same enemies in the same environment,
but without any reason for the PCs to help each other), a local co-presence can
mean that the players simply sit beside each other while playing but don’t talk to
or otherwise interact with each other. Note also the difference between the
virtual co-presence and a proper single-player game: although the player is
without a human co-player in both, a game with a virtual co-presence involves
some kind of role or player character that might be controlled by a human but is
not, whereas in a proper single-player game the game is built so that the player
9 The types discussed by de Kort and IJsselsteijn are related to the level of mediation (of which the AI
co-presence is considered an extreme example, which might be criticized). Other variables might be
relevant to consider as well. One example is knowledge of presence without mediation: an audience that
the player knows to be there but that does not interact with them—for instance in professional e-sports, or
when streaming game content online. It is likely that the knowledge influences the experience, similar to
how the mere knowledge of the relationship of the co-player influences it (Ravaja, 2009).
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is alone by design. This difference in design—whether everything in the game
have been thought out so that they could work for several players as well as for
only a single player, or whether the designers have been able to focus on
designing the game solely for a single-player experience—might have a great
impact on the game experience, and in addition to the importance to recognize
this difference in any model about a game experience, the difference is also
paramount for experimental control.
The third factor, the relations between the participants, is also an important
one: it is different to play with your child, friend, spouse, father, or boss, or with
a stranger—the relationship outside the situation (cf. Jakobs & Fischer, 1997).
This effect interacts with the roles within the situation that are partly set by the
digital features. It is different to play while the other watches, or to play in
cooperation with that person or to compete with them; to play a game where the
skills of the players, or the roles or abilities within the game are clearly unequal;
or to play for fun vs. playing for money. The relationship effects are assumed to
be more pronounced when the social presence increases, and vice versa.
***
Despite being the most concrete look at the topic, the SCF still operates on a
rather high level, and like the other models, it discusses little about what the
effects might actually be. An important reason was surely that there was not
much research on the social factors at the time. After 2008, however, several
empirical studies have investigated relevant social factors and their effects on
the emotional game experience. My interpretation above is of course influenced
by the empirical studies now available.
1.1.2. Current empirical research on social context
1.1.2.1. Co-presence and relationship effects
The second and third factors are the most obvious ones, and the most studied
(which is probably why de Kort and IJsselsteijn focused on the more neglected
first one in their paper). The social context is influenced by the other people—by
whether they are present, and by who they are. There are several studies on the
effect of games played with a human and virtual co-presence, with both
physiological and self-reported measures. This comparison has been extended
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especially with examinations of two separate factors, one focusing on the type of
co-presence (local, mediated, and virtual co-presence), and the other on the
relationship between the players.
Effects of the type of co-presence has been since directly tested by Gajadhar
and others in cooperation with de Kort and IJsselsteijn, with self-report
measures of positive affect, social presence, and other constructs. They report
that player enjoyment increased from virtual/mediated co-presence (no
difference between these two) to local co-presence, and that social presence
mediated this effect (Gajadhar, de Kort, & IJsselsteijn, 2008). Interestingly,
when senior participants were investigated (Gajadhar, Nap, de Kort, &
IJsselsteijn, 2010), the virtual and the local co-presence conditions did not
differ in positive affect, and mediated co-presence was actually experienced as
less positive; social presence was also found to mediate the effects. Mediated vs.
virtual co-presence was also studied by Weibel and others, who found that self-
reported enjoyment (along with flow and spatial presence) was higher when
playing with a human (Weibel, Wissmath, Habegger, Steiner, & Groner, 2008);
the same findings were reported by Merritt and others (2011), and Lim and
Reeves (2010, although due to the restricted nature of the game setting, the
ecological validity of this study is suspect). As a good display of experimental
control, in all these studies the mediated and virtual conditions were actually
identical except for the fact that the participants were told that in one they
played against a human and in another against an AI (in the Gajadhar and Lim
& Reeves studies the purported virtual conditions were also played by a human,
and in Merritt and Weibel studies the purported mediated condition was played
by an AI). Furthermore, some studies controlled for the performance in the
game: winning the game was associated with more enjoyment than losing, but
the effect was small and uncertain and did not explain the differences between
the conditions (Gajadhar et al., 2008; Gajadhar, de Kort, & IJsselsteijn, 2009;
Merritt et al., 2011, had similar results).
The relationship of players was also manipulated in the Gajadhar and others’
(2008) study, employing both friends and strangers as opponents, but they
found differences only in social presence (more in the friend condition) and not
in positive affect. Mandryk and others focused on methodology on their two
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studies, but also provided preliminary (with a small sample of 10) physiological
evidence for the effects of playing locally against a friend vs. a computer AI
(Mandryk, Inkpen, et al., 2006), and evidence for the difference in experience
between playing locally against a friend vs. a stranger vs. an AI (Mandryk &
Atkins, 2007): in all cases, the physiological signals indicated higher positive
affect when the opponent was a human and lower when playing against a virtual
co-presence. Further, this effect may be facilitated if the other player is a friend
instead of a stranger, although the effect seems to be smaller and more
uncertain. These findings have been also found independently in our own lab for
differences between a friend, a stranger, and a computer AI in a locally played
game (Ravaja, Saari, Turpeinen, et al., 2006), and for the same conditions but
with mediated co-presence (players located in different rooms) instead of local
co-presence (Ravaja, 2009).
The Ravaja and Mandryk studies did not include a social presence measure
(although both Ravaja studies reported the related self-report measures of
engagement and spatial presence, which seemed to follow the same pattern as
positive affect). On the other hand, Cairns and others (Cairns, Cox, & Day, 2013)
report that social presence was higher in a co-located than mediated condition
(a finding also repeated by Martin, 2010) and higher in a mediated than virtual
condition (as was immersion, in contrast to local vs mediated comparison).
(They also report difference between friend and stranger opponents, but only
for immersion and with only nine stranger participants.)
In sum, a rather robust (independent of the wide range of measurements
used) finding seems to be that playing with a human is experienced as more
positive than playing with a virtual co-presence of a computer-controlled AI.
The positive affect is probably higher in both the mediated co-presence (instead
of local) and the stranger-relationship (instead of a friend) contexts in relation
to a virtual co-presence context, but not as much as a local and/or friend co-
player would. However, the exception by the senior sample—who reported the
mediated co-presence as the least positive, and the virtual co-presence as
equally positive to local (Gajadhar et al., 2009)—calls for caution when
generalizing the results, as an apparently atypical sample significantly deviated
from the pattern. Interestingly, although the social presence seems to be
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associated with the emotional effects as proposed by de Kort and IJsselsteijn
(2008), the positive affect did not covary with social presence (Gajadhar et al.,
2008).
1.1.2.2. Competition and cooperation
Another topic rather widely studied is the relationship between the players
within the play situation, namely, the comparison between competition and
cooperation (purview of the third factor). However, this is mainly due to the
importance of the topic outside game research, focusing on outcome variables
such as cooperativeness after and outside the game (Ewoldsen et al., 2012) and
aggressiveness (Schmierbach, 2010), or motivation in exergames (Peng &
Hsieh, 2012). A few of the aggression studies have measured self-reported
arousal, but with conflicting evidence, one reporting that cooperative play is
experienced as less arousing, but only for males (Schmierbach, 2010), and
another reporting that cooperative play was experienced as more arousing (with
apparently no analysis on the influence of gender; Velez, Mahood, Ewoldsen, &
Moyer-Guse, 2012). While the evidence here is weak, the potential difference
between males and females in regard to competition is well established at least
in behavioral economics in that males prefer it to cooperation while females do
not (e.g., Niederle & Vesterlund, 2008; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004).
Within game research, an early theoretical work suggested that competition
is critical for enjoyment in games (Vorderer, Hartmann, & Klimmt, 2003), and
this has been also found in survey studies on game motivation (e.g., Sherry,
Lucas, Greenberg, & Lachlan, 2006). Schmierbach and others (2012) reported
that competitive game mode indeed was self-reported as more enjoyable than
cooperative, while Emmerich and Masuch (2013) reported higher positive affect
for competitive mode and no difference in negative affect; however, competitive
mode was associated with lower social presence. The only study reporting
effects on physiological measurements was by Lim and Reeves (2010), who
reported higher arousal (SC and HR) during competition across co-presence
conditions, in addition to lower self-reported valence (in the virtual co-presence
conditions only). Emmerich and Masuch report no differences between genders,
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while the other studies did not report testing gender differences in the first
place.
As a summary, there is some evidence for higher (self-reported) positive
affect during competition, as compared to cooperation, but conflicting evidence
whether this effect is influenced by gender or whether arousal would be higher
in competition or cooperation. Contrary to expectations based on the SCM, in
one study, social presence and positive affect had a negative association.
1.1.2.3. Physical features
As opposed to academic interest on competition and cooperation originating
from other research fields, studies on the physical context of game play have
been more exploratory in their methods, using case studies or very weakly
controlled experiments in their search for practical solutions. Of the more
convincing ones, de Grove and others examined the influence of school vs. home
as the playing environment for a learning game (De Grove, Cauberghe, & Van
Looy, 2014). The playing was enjoyed more at home, although when playing
time and technical performance were controlled, the difference disappeared.
Jurgelionis and others made a similar comparison between a public internet
café and home, reporting barely higher self-reported positive affect at home (in
addition to higher flow and lower boredom; Jurgelionis et al., 2011). However,
Engl and Nacke (2013) compared mobile (in a tram) play environment to home,
and found no difference in self-reported positive affect, but higher negative
affect (and immersion) in the mobile context. Further analyses revealed that the
higher negative affect was reported by males but not by females. All studies
included only implicit social context (other people present, but not specifically
participating in play) in the non-home condition.
Communication affordances have been studied by Shahid and others, who
compared the effects of a local co-presence and two different video-mediated
conditions, one with a possibility for a mutual gaze and one without, in child
participants (Shahid, Krahmer, & Swerts, 2012). They found that the gaze
condition was reported to be more fun than the local co-presence condition,
while the no gaze condition was the least fun (and the least engaging, compared
to the other two), in line with assumptions by the SCF. A video chat (apparently
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with a gaze opportunity) was also found more fun than no video-mediation by
young adults and seniors in a case study (Derboven, Van Gils, & De Grooff,
2011). However, Gajadhar and others investigated the presence of video and
audio communication during play, and found no difference in self-reported
positive affect between no communication, only video, only audio, or both audio
and video (Gajadhar et al., 2009; although flow increased and frustration
decreased linearly across these conditions).
In sum, when comparing home to other playing environments, the home
might be experienced more positively, but the evidence is contradictory and the
studies are not well controlled. Same can be said about communication
affordances: possible support for the higher affordances for experienced
communication more positively, but the studies are weak and partly
contradictory. Evidence also exists for the influence of superficial physical
factors on media experience (such as screen size; e.g., Reeves, Lang, Kim, &
Tatar, 1999; Ravaja, Saari, Kallinen, & Laarni, 2006), but less on games (but see
screen size and game camera perspective; Hou, Nam, Peng, & Lee, 2012;
Kallinen, Salminen, Ravaja, Kedzior, & Sääksjärvi, 2007), and to my knowledge
none that are taking the social context into account.
1.1.2.4. Audience effects
The presence of another is typically considered to be in the role of an active
co-player, but the other possibility is in the role of an audience (cf. Kallio et al.,
2010). There are studies that suggest different audience effects—again,
contradictory findings for emotional experience (Bowman, Weber, Tamborini, &
Sherry, 2013; Downs, Vetere, Howard, Loughnan, & Smith, 2014; Kappen et al.,
2014), but also interesting suggestions on effects of anticipation and play
around the turn-taking (Downs, Vetere, & Howard, 2013)—but as they are
outside the focus of this dissertation, I will not discuss them further.
1.1.2.5. Social presence and physiological linkage
As defined earlier, social presence is the feeling of being with others (Biocca
et al., 2003), and arguably it is both affected by the social affordances provided
by the contextual factors, and in turn it then affects the game experience in a
play situation (de Kort & IJsselsteijn, 2008). In addition to the original self-
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report instrument by Biocca and Harms (Biocca & Harms, 2003), social
presence can also be assessed by the questionnaire specifically developed for the
game context (de Kort et al., 2007), which is used by all the empirical studies on
games reporting social presence above. In a previous article my colleagues and I
presented an alternative metric related to social presence (I. Ekman et al.,
2012): physiological linkage (also called compliance), a synchronization of
physiological signals between two (or more) players in a social situation.
Physiological linkage has been found to increase when people intensively
interact with each other (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993; Kimura & Daibo,
2006), and it is correlated with the accuracy to perceive others’ emotions
(related to empathy; Levenson & Ruef, 1992) and mutual understanding
(Järvelä, Chanel, Kuikkaniemi, & Ravaja, 2011), and it can be used to estimate
team performance on collaborative tasks (Elkins et al., 2009; Henning,
Boucsein, & Gil, 2001). It is thought to originate from the unconscious tendency
to imitate other people, based on the automatic evaluations and mental
simulation that constitute our understanding of others (Adolphs, 2003; Spapé
et al., 2013), but both the theoretical and practical understanding of it are still
very limited.
While physiological linkage offers an intriguing opportunity for
measurements of a central variable in the SCF, its background and practical use
falls beyond the focus of this work.
1.1.2.6. Conclusion
The sociality characteristics framework provides a conceptual tool for
understanding how the game experience is influenced by the social context. My
interpretation of the three social context factors concretizes this understanding
to making sense of the mutual relationships between the factors and identifying
the individual effects. Although there is considerably more empirical research
on social context factors now than in 2008, the topic is far from exhausted.
Preliminary evidence is now available for effects of all three context factors,
although much of it was conflicting and/or weak. However, in addition to the
factors, SCF describes how the factors determine the affordances, which in turn
determine the social presence, which both is part of the game experience (as
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social presence is assumed to be a positive experience) and also influences it as
a moderator for the factors. Unfortunately, there is currently no research on
these later steps of the model. The little evidence on the association between the
valence of game experience and social presence was contradictory, suggesting
that the relationship between them is possibly not as straightforward as
presented in the SCF.
1.2. Emotion
As can be seen from the previous section, it is not rare that digital game
research discusses emotions or even that apparently emotional terms (such as
“enjoyment”, “fun”, “boredom”, and “anxiety”) are used as key concepts.
However, as the game researchers come from widely different backgrounds,
ranging from computer sciences to cultural studies to various fields of
psychology, the understanding of what emotions are, how they work (what is
their effect), and how could they be measured, varies significantly. And although
there is a century-old tradition of emotion research in psychology, this literature
is almost10 never utilized in game research.
One reason, no doubt, is the fragmented situation of the emotion theories:
after a century of emotion research, different theories attempting to explain how
emotions work are counted in dozens, if not hundreds, and the researchers still
cannot agree on what an emotion is (for more details, see the two Special
sections on the topic that ultimately do not reach a conclusion, in the journal
Emotion Review: Izard, 2010; Russell, 2012). With the theories also often
focusing on very specific features of the complicated phenomena of emotions,
they are also difficult to apply to a specialized field with complex and still
relatively poorly understood stimuli, such as digital games. As a result, most
game experience research has little or no connection to the emotion literature
(for a rare and undervalued exception, see A. Lang, 2006).
1.2.1. A brief look into current emotion theories
Despite the differences, there are certain basics that almost everyone in
psychological research of emotion now agrees on. Most importantly, the
10 As the most notable exception, the psychophysiological approach to games is the most connected to
the current emotion research. I’ll return to this a bit later.
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neuroscientific and psychophysiological research has provided so much
evidence of the (neuro)physiological basis of emotions that it has been seen as a
paradigm shift in Kuhnian sense, changing the focus of the concept itself from
subjective experiences to the neural perspective (P. J. Lang, 2014). Neural
pathways and brain structures that carry and process emotional information
have been investigated and identified (to an extent; see e.g., Panksepp, 2008) as
well as autonomic nervous system (ANS) responses related to emotion (e.g.,
Kreibig, 2010), and these findings have been recognized among (although not
always integrated to) the emotion theories. Practically all current theories make
their own interpretations on how these findings support their particular view.
A broad consensus also now holds that emotions constitute evolutionary
adaptations to regulate behavior of an individual in ways that increased genetic
propagation by our mammalian and even more distant ancestors (Tooby &
Cosmides, 2008; LeDoux, 2012). Evolutionary emergence of higher neural
structures did not replace the more primitive organizations, however, but
instead organized on top of them, developing experience-dependent associative
knowledge system, more powerful anticipatory information processing, and
eventually conscious strategies to cope with the primal survival functions. At the
same time, however, it is important to notice that evolutionary development of
emotions does not make them (entirely) genetically determined: it has evolved
with our cognitive ability to be flexible, to answer different challenges in
different environments and situations. That flexibility manifests in how
surrounding culture and the personal history modify the individual emotional
responses to different culturally and personally salient situations (Mesquita &
Boiger, 2014).
Finally, emotions are largely acknowledged to include different kinds of
signals we associate with emotions, often called emotion components (Mauss &
Robinson, 2009): typically (1) the facial, vocal, and bodily expressions (e.g.,
smiling or frowning, aggressive or lowered voice, diminished or withdrawing
posture); (2) the physiological responses (e.g., heart rate, changes in autonomic
nervous system activation); (3) the behavior or behavioral tendency (e.g.,
attacking, fleeing); and (4) the subjective feeling (e.g., feeling afraid or happy).
Sometimes other components are also included, especially appraisal, which
29
refers to the automatic evaluation of particular features of the stimulus or
situation in order to determine the suitable emotional reaction (Scherer, 2005;
also see appraisal theories below). All these are phenomena that a theory of
emotion is supposed to explain. While in the past it was thought that ‘emotion’
is something that caused the changes in these components (Russell, 2003, pp.
151–152), scholars now widely reject this essentialist notion: if emotion causes
the components, what is emotion? Emotion does not have an ‘essence’, it is not
a particular naturally demarcated thing we could simply point and name
(Barrett, 2013)—instead the word ‘emotion’ can be used as a descriptor for the
whole process that leads to the components, or simply for the collection of the
components themselves (Zachar, 2014).
1.2.1.1. Four theory families
Apart from these common agreements, the different theories strongly
disagree on how emotions are formed, from which fundamental parts, and to
which extent automatically elicited or cognitively constructed. The most
prominent emotion theories can be grouped roughly into four theory families:
basic emotion theories, constructionist theories, dimensional theories, and
appraisal theories.
When trying to explain what emotions are and how they work, one intuitively
thinks about situations where the experience has been as clear as possible, and
how they differ from other situations: surely we can start from the fact that fear
and anger and happiness are all different from each other? They feel different,
and look different to an outside observer, in how they are expressed, and how
they make people behave. One of the oldest and historically most popular views
starts with this intuition. Basic emotion theories posit that certain basic
emotions (sometimes called discrete or distinct emotions) with distinct
subjective feelings—such as anger, fear, sadness, and happiness, but probably
not those such as jealousy, embarrassment, or excitement, although this varies
across theories—are discrete categories (clearly distinct from each other) and
universal (same across cultures and individuals). Most add that while other
emotional feelings may exist, the basic emotions are fundamental and the
others, like the jealousy and the others mentioned above, are based on them;
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and that basic emotions are separately evolved adaptations with specific neural
circuitries that activate in response to specific salient stimuli types to function
as specific behavior programs beneficial in that emotional situation (e.g., P.
Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Panksepp, 2004; Levenson, 2011). Typically basic
emotion theories list the particular emotions (which may be emotion families or
categories instead of singular emotions) they consider basic on various grounds
and define ‘emotion’ to refer only to these categories. Some basic emotion
theorists focus on the external components (especially the traditional view by P.
Ekman, 1999), but many current theories emphasize the internal neuroscientific
signals and the evolutionary perspective (e.g., Levenson, 2011; Panksepp &
Watt, 2011; Tracy, 2014). Due to evidence of emotion-specific neural circuits,
neuroscientists are often grouped among basic emotion theorists, even when
they explicitly deny it themselves (e.g., LeDoux, 2014). (See Russell, Rosenberg,
& Lewis, 2011, for the contemporary look at basic emotions.)
Theories that call themselves constructionist ones are currently, and have
historically been, largely a reaction to basic emotion theories, because they
disagree that fixed categories can adequately describe emotion (Barrett, 2013).
Instead, they argue that the variability in human emotional experience and
expression is far too variable to be explained by a limited set because basic
emotions are not biological “natural kinds” but cultural conventions. According
to constructionists, the evidence for basic emotions is severely lacking (Barrett
et al., 2007; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012), although
their critiques have in turn been criticized for using unfair strawman arguments
(e.g., Lench, Bench, & Flores, 2013). According to construction theories,
emotions are constructed from core psychological principles via domain-general
(i.e., not specific to only emotions) processes that take into account much more
context than what basic emotion theories typically allow. The stimulus does not
simply elicit an emotion; rather, the stimulus is actively (albeit typically
unconsciously) attributed, contextualized, and conceptualized, which results in
constructing a unique emotion according to myriad individual and (social and
physical) contextual differences (Barrett, 2014; Russell, 2003). Emotion is
therefore constructed, and each emotion is unique because it has been
constructed to a unique situation.  (See Cunningham, 2013, for the
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contemporary look at psychological constructivism; see also Mesquita & Boiger,
2014, for a social constructionist view.)
The current constructionist theories after Russell’s (2003) core affect theory
are often (but not always: see e.g., Mesquita & Boiger, 2014) also dimensional
theories. Instead of attempting to explain how emotions are formed, the
dimensional theories more practically aim to describe the structure of different
emotions and of their relationship to each other. According to these theories,
emotions do not differ from each other categorically, but rather in a matter of
degrees along some central dimensions, typically valence (comprising pleasure-
displeasure axis) and arousal (or bodily activation). For example, “happy” and
“sad” can be located roughly at the opposite ends of the valence dimension, with
roughly similar levels of arousal, while “afraid” and “relaxed” are opposite
terms, in both, valence and arousal, dimensions (i.e., “afraid” in the sector
corresponding with high arousal and negative valence, and “relaxed” in the
sector corresponding with low arousal and positive valence, see Figure 3)11. The
original emotional dimensions were obtained from research on subjective
emotion reports that found that all the emotion words can be represented
adequately by a circumplex formed around the two axes (Russell, 1980)12. Later
research has found important psychophysiological signals linked to the
dimensions, and the specific connection to motivational system, pleasure being
related to approach and displeasure to avoidance motivation (P. J. Lang, 1995;
Bradley, 2000). Sometimes, the alternate conception of somewhat independent
Positive Activation and Negative Activation dimensions (Tellegen, Watson, &
Clark, 1999) is also employed. This alternative organization presents the
positive and negative activation as separate and relatively independent
dimensions—that is, unlike the bipolar model, it acknowledges that people can
have both positive and negative emotions at the same time (see Bradley, 2000).
11   In addition, a third axis, dominance (sometimes called potency; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977), has
been suggested, which would further differentiate between words representing discrete states such as
“afraid” and “angry”, both of which are otherwise associated with high arousal and negative valence in the
two-dimensional model. Possibly because its explanatory power was much smaller to the valence and
arousal axes, researchers have often settled on the simpler two-dimensional model.
12 With predecessors, among others, already in Wundt’s idea of six basic feelings that can be organized
in three bipolar dimensions, in 1896 (see Reisenzein, 2000).
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While the basic emotion theories and constructionist theories offer rival
understanding of how emotions form in a broad sense (and dimensional
theories a rival description to basic emotions), most scholars regardless of
theoretical orientation accept that the appraisal theories do capture something
important about the emotion process: they zoom in to the specifics of how the
mind must evaluate (appraise) the stimulus according to a set of criteria in
order to produce the appropriate response. The premise is that evaluating the
stimulus is likely divided into smaller problems so that each appraisal process
evaluates a specific feature of the stimulus and determines between biologically
predefined appraisal values (e.g., relevant/irrelevant to current goals).
Interacting together, these appraisals define the emotion (for example, the
instance of anger). Some theorists form systematic models to explain basic
emotions (e.g., Roseman, 2013) while others attempt to describe the abstract
and/or neural processes by which appraisals work (e.g., Scherer, 2009). (See
Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013, for the contemporary look at
appraisal theories.)
1.2.1.2. Emotion theories and games
To my knowledge, no study has empirically investigated the relative merits of
different approaches on emotions in empirical game experience research (for
Figure 3. Valence – arousal dimensions showing self-reported emotion terms located around
the circumplex, according to Russell (1980). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Valence-Arousal_Circumplex.jpg © Fox, Lewis & McGuire / Wikimedia Commons / CC-
BY-3.0
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the closest thing available, see Madeira, Arriaga, Adrião, Lopes, & Esteves,
2013), but something can be inferred from the choices the previous researchers
have made, and from looking at the theories themselves.
Whether or not strictly true in all of their assumptions, the basic emotion
theories have been found useful for many research questions in emotion
research over the years (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). What about the
empirical game experience research? Very few researchers have used the basic
emotions view in the digital game context (some examples include Merkx,
Truong, & Neerincx, 2007; Liu, Agrawal, Sarkar, & Chen, 2009), and even when
discrete emotional states have been studied, often the emotions chosen have
diverted strongly from those typically listed by the basic emotion theorists,
listing states like boredom, engagement, frustration, or fun (e.g., Chanel,
Rebetez, Bétrancourt, & Pun, 2008; Mandryk & Atkins, 2007). To be fair,
though, game researchers seem to have rarely familiarized themselves with
current basic emotion research, which might be considered much more practical
for game research purposes than the traditional collection of anger, fear,
sadness, happiness, surprise, and disgust. For example, Panksepp’s PLAY
primary process (Panksepp, 2005) and the difference between affective and
predatory aggression (Panksepp & Zellner, 2004) seem potentially useful for the
game violence/aggression studies, as do Ekman’s latest list of probable positive
basic emotions for game experience research (including, e.g., sensory pleasures,
excitement, and fiero; P. Ekman & Cordaro, 2011).
However, the issue is deeper than just finding the right list of emotions.
While the basic emotion theories generally accept that other affective states than
basic emotions do exist, they typically limit these other states outside their
focus. During any activity, most of the time people experience some kind of
continuous stream affective states of varying intensity, be they called emotions
or not (cf. Cunningham, Dunfield, & Stillman, 2013; Zelenski & Larsen, 2000).
Of these, basic emotions make up arguably only a very small part, as they are
considered relatively rare and temporally short (P. Ekman, 1994); the basic
emotion approach is not very useful for game research if it limits most of the
game experience outside its focus. Indeed, first-hand reports of game
experiences rarely report basic emotions (e.g., Sherry et al., 2006; Raney et al.,
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2006; Kallio et al., 2010), and it is unclear how the relevant affective states like
fun, enjoyment, frustration, or boredom, are related to basic emotions. A
committed research agenda would be needed to map the relationships between
basic emotions and game emotions and the implications of such structures.
Although the details vary, the other theories have largely the same problem:
their theoretical details are not easily applied to practical study, especially in the
context of a complex stimulus like digital games. Constructionist theories allow
(indeed, require) a vast variety of emotions, without the need to declare, for
example, “fun” somehow less of an emotion than “happiness”—intuitively, a
player of digital games can probably recognize experiencing fun, which is
probably related to happiness but should not be equated with it—but the
question is how can the constructionist theories be applied to the practical game
research. Certainly, the constructionist accounts can inform the researchers
and, for example, help understand how a game experience questionnaire should
approach emotion terms (Clore & Ortony, 2013), but in many ways these
theories operate on such an abstract level that they do not provide practical
tools or predictions for the specific needs of game researchers. I am not aware of
any game studies that would have used them.
Appraisal theories, mostly, do provide concrete empirical claims. Especially
the component process model (CPM) by Scherer (2001, 2013) makes assertions
about the nature and order of different appraisals which provide possible
research directions for studying games. There have actually been some studies
where the emotion theorists have used digital games to test the appraisal theory
(e.g., van Reekum et al., 2004), but I have not seen game researchers using the
theory for research purposes, although there are clearly opportunities. For
example, the suggestion by Scherer (2013) that there are actually six different
types of valence should be interesting for game experience theorists, for
example in guiding the development of new experimental experience
questionnaires. Similarly, the aggressiveness/violence research could be
benefited by experimentally testing the goal conduciveness, coping potential,
and norm compatibility stimulus evaluation checks to find out which kind of
game situations cause which kind of appraisals that end up in anger and
aggressiveness, and compare that to the current assumptions of how games
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might be associated with violence (Markey & Markey, 2010; see also: C. J.
Ferguson, 2007).
To my knowledge, the dimensional valence-arousal model seems to be the
only emotion-theoretic contribution that has been utilized in the game research
field to any meaningful extent. Following the general psychophysiological
research, the psychophysiological game research has routinely interpreted the
physiological measures as indices of the emotional dimensions (e.g., Mandryk &
Atkins, 2007; Drachen, Nacke, Yannakakis, & Pedersen, 2010; Poels, van den
Hoogen, IJsselsteijn, & de Kort, 2012). However, it has been typical that these
studies have taken the dimensional model as granted, without considering the
theoretical background properly and without discussing the limitations of the
measurements as such indices13. For instance, in one of the core articles on this,
Lang (1995) claims that the emotion and motivation can be conceptualized as
two dimensions of valence and arousal, but his argument for that claim is the
motivational system is an evolutionary adaptation and that certain stimuli—
particularly those related to personal well-being—are hard-wired to activate that
system. This is not trivially applied to a radically different context, such as
digital games. In fact, Lang specifically mentions that his evidence pertains to
“states of vigilance, when the organism is stopped but actively orienting”, of
which the picture viewing is a quintessential example (P. J. Lang, 1995, p.
382)—and a notable deviation from a game context. Although later, Ravaja
(2004) reviews several reports of successful use of the method in other contexts,
such as sounds and moving picture, they still adhere to that basic assumption.
Neglecting these assumptions and extending the justification to vastly different
context is potentially dangerous, as it misinforms the readers about the
relationship of the measure and the theoretical concept.
Next, I briefly present the methods of measuring emotions, specifically
focusing on the measures used in game research studies and their known
limitations, and describe the relationship between measurements and the
theoretical concepts they profess to index.
13 And by “typical”, I also refer to my own publications.
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1.2.2. Measuring emotions
Because of the disagreement of the theoretical basis of emotion, it might
expected that the same disagreement extends to measurements as well. In
contrast, the researchers are relatively same-minded about them, mainly due to
the agreement of the emotion components which manifest the emotions—
whatever their form and operation—to the outside world. As emotions are seen
as multicomponent phenomena, there is no single sufficient method for
measuring “the emotions” directly; instead, one must measure the components,
which can then be used to infer something about the psychology behind them.
Peter Lang (2014, p. 96) states about measuring emotions: “[T]here are three
measurement domains available to a science of emotion: affective language
(evaluative and expressive), overt behavior, and physiological reactivity.” A
review on measures of emotion by Mauss and Robinson (2009) largely agrees.
Affective language covers everything from text analyses (related to the
expressive and perhaps to the behavioral component) to introspective self-
assessment in an interview or in response to pre-made questionnaires (related
to the subjective feeling and expressive components). Physiological reactivity,
related mostly14 to the physiological component, covers measurements as
diverse as direct signal measurements (such as skin conductance),
measurements of indices calculated from simpler signals (from number of skin
conductance responses to complicated indices of heart rate variability and
electroencephalographic frequency analyses), measurements taken during a
specific research paradigm (such as the startle eyeblink magnitude), and
complicated imaging techniques (such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging of the brain).
In the context of this dissertation, with the focus on a clearly bounded,
relatively short play situation, I consider only self-report questionnaires among
the measurements of affective language, and mainly direct signals and some
14 Although Mauss and Robinson (2009) count facial activity as a behavioral measure, I consider it
among physiological measurements, because in the context of this dissertation it is measured directly from
the muscles and not assessed from observations. As Bradley (2000) states, the physiological and behavioral
components have a particularly close link due to the fact that behavior cannot occur without some
physiological changes.
37
indices calculated from them among the physiological signals. Further, I do not
discuss observational assessments of behavior.
1.2.2.1. Self-reports
The often-used self-report measures of emotion include questionnaires based
on the dimensional theories, such as the pictorial Self-Assessment Manikins
(SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994) and various grid-forms of the valence and arousal
dimensions (validated, e.g., Larsen, Norris, McGraw, Hawkley, & Cacioppo,
2009; or ad hoc measures such as in Merkx et al., 2007) or PANAS, which is
based on the hierarchical model of emotions and therefore also covers discrete
emotions (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). In addition to theoretically
justified questionnaires, game researchers have studied subjective emotional
experiences by using single ad hoc items (e.g., “How much did you enjoy the
game session?”; Merritt et al., 2011), or items as part of other constructs such as
flow (e.g., Takatalo, Häkkinen, Kaistinen, & Nyman, 2010).
However, while it is too often simply taken as granted that the self-reports
reliably convey what the individual has subjective experienced, the potential for
biases and distortions in self-report measures is well documented. First, the
meaning of words (or images) by which the self-report item or an interview
question is conveyed is not obvious or universal, and the simple semantic
structure of the sentence may have a significant influence on the responses
(Ahlawat, 1985). While there are attempts to prove particular words as more
valid as descriptors of emotion, the results are contradictory, and raise
questions about the influence of the pre-existing theoretical leaning of the
researchers (see e.g., Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007; versus Yik,
Russell, & Steiger, 2011). In addition, the used words guide the interpretation,
such as the reconstruction of a previous experience (in the context of judicial
use of eyewitness evidence, see Innocence Project, 2009); simply the choice of
particular words in the question will lead the respondent to think about the
experience in regard to those particular concepts, regardless of whether they
would have been the concepts the respondents would have used themselves
(Slater, 2004). Second, the memory is not a perfect reproduction of the
experience, and the memory is decayed more and more with the passage of
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time: for example Robinson and Clore (2002) concluded that self-reports of
one’s current experience (“online”) are likely to be more valid than self-reports
concerning past, future, or trait-related experiences of emotion. Furthermore,
situation-specific and identity-related beliefs are processed differently, and
retained social stereotypes and personality traits all influence how we see the
target of the inquiry, and thus the responses (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Third,
there are several effects that further affect the response, such as social
desirability effect (Paulhus & Reid, 1991), and the simple case that sometimes
the respondent does not want to answer completely (or at all) truthfully
(Krumpal, 2011). In addition, the influence of each of these sources potentially
varies culturally, between individuals, and between different situations.
1.2.2.2. Physiological measurements
The physiological measurements tap into the bodily responses that are under
the influence of autonomic and somatic nervous system. Unlike self-report
measures, physiological measures are not affected by memory, question
formulation, or social desirability, so some researchers have considered them as
more objective than self-report measures (e.g., Mandryk, Atkins, & Inkpen,
2006). Objectively, they do have the advantage to be able to give information on
processes that self-reports have no possibility to tap: online measurements of
continuous signals that give a view on the emotion process as it happens, and
the temporal resolution that allows examination of momentary changes (phasic
data in addition to tonic), for example, in response to individual interesting
events.
The psychophysiological measures are typically used within the dimensional
emotion approach (e.g., Mandryk & Atkins, 2007; Nacke, Grimshaw, & Lindley,
2010). Briefly, facial electromyogram (EMG) activity in zygomaticus major and
orbicularis oculi (ZM and OO, activated when smiling) muscles is considered a
good index for positive valence, and activity from corrugator supercilii muscle
(CS, activated when frowning) for negative valence (Tassinary & Cacioppo,
2000; P. J. Lang, 1995). Electrodermal activity (EDA) is a widely used measure
for assessing arousal (P. J. Lang, 1995; Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000). Heart
rate is often used to index arousal, although this may be suspect in many cases,
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because the heart responds so broadly to all kinds of changes, not only arousal
(Ravaja, 2004; Brownley, Hurwitz, & Schneiderman, 2000). Other measures,
such as respiration as another measure of arousal (Ravaja, 2004), are also
sometimes used. In addition, electroencephalography (EEG), the only relatively
cheap method of studying brain activity (in contrast with the massive prices of
brain imaging techniques like fMRI) can be used to examine a wide variety of
phenomena (Davidson, Jackson, & Larson, 2000), but in regard to emotion
research, the specifically useful measure is the frontal asymmetry: the activation
difference between frontal lobes related to approach-avoidance motivation,
which is closely linked to emotion (Salminen, Kivikangas, Ravaja, & Kallinen,
2009; P. J. Lang, 1995).
Like data originating from self-report measures, however, physiological
measures are still far from being direct measures of emotion. They are subject to
their own range of external influences, such as movement artifacts and technical
difficulties. In addition, just as with self-reports, physiological data must be
interpreted to make inferences about emotions, and due to the complexity of
human physiology, especially in a complex stimulus context, this is not exactly
straightforward (Ravaja, 2004).
1.2.3. Making inferences based on measurements
Although too often the measures are used as if they had almost direct
relationship to the emotion dimensions, it is forgotten that in reality the
relationship is complicated—that measures do not tell much themselves, but
that they are used for making inferences (see Figure 4). As Cacioppo and others
(2000b) stress in the introductory chapter of Handbook of Psychophysiology15,
in a given context, only some of the signals are related to the hypothesized
underlying psychological (emotional) processes, and then only in part (Cacioppo
et al., 2000b)—and of course the same applies to self-reports. That the
relationship between the two is relatively distant is demonstrated by the rather
low correspondence between physiological and self-report measures: it is
actually rather an exception than a rule when the two neatly converge
(covariations around ten to twenty percent of the variance across the response
15 They talk about psychophysiological measures, but the point can be extended to all measures.
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systems have been mentioned as typical; Bradley & Lang, 2000; see also Mauss
& Robinson, 2009; Russell, 2009; Barrett, 2013). This does not mean that the
two are unrelated. Both are imperfect signals of the individual components only
partly reflecting the underlying emotional processes, contaminated with non-
relevant processes and noise. Because both have their own flawed view to the
emotional processes that are the real target of the measurements, both are also
needed. However, in general psychophysiology, the work about the validity of
psychophysiological measures is still slowly proceeding about the very basic
contexts and processes: perception, imagination, and anticipation, while the
action is still relatively untouched (Bradley & Lang, 2007). This means that in
the field of game research, where the stimulus is much more challenging for
making solid inferences, we should be especially careful in using our methods
properly.
1.3. Aims of the study
As stated in the beginning, this work has two approaches that rely on each
other. The critical approach builds on the theoretical contributions to frame the
measures and their interpretation within the existing research literature. The
Figure  4. The  process  of  measuring  emotion.  We  want  to  find  out  something  about  the
emotional processes (which we are not entirely sure of what they exactly are), for example, the
theoretical construct “arousal”. The processes cause observable emotion components, which can
be sampled by the measure. The measure, however, is also confounded by non-relevant
processes and noise, introducing error to the measure. We detect the signal produced by the
measure, which we analyze statistically to infer something about the emotional processes.
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empirical approach uses the measures to present novel empirical results about
the emotions experienced during social game play. The discussion integrates
these approaches and offers new understanding of the social context of digital
game play and how it relates to emotions. Table 1 summarizes the Studies and
their foci.
Study I (Kivikangas et al., 2011) is a review on psychophysiological measures
used in game research, on which I base the overview on how game research
literature have relied on emotional theories as their justification for the
measures. Then, Study II (Kivikangas, in press) presents my own synthesis of
emotion theories, which offers a novel view on the emotional processing. In this
dissertation, I use these two studies to take a critical look at the measurements
of emotion in digital game research, with the aim to find a more comprehensive
and, hopefully, a more accurate view on what measuring emotion is and can be.
Because the empirical studies were conducted before this work, they have still
used the old paradigms, but in the discussion, my aim is to apply this new
knowledge to reinterpret the results where applicable.
Looking at the empirical results on the context factors as they are presented
in the previous section, certain factors seem more important than others: the
Table 1. Summary of the articles and the four experiments.
Study Nature of study Study focus
Study I Review A review of psychophysiological measurements and how
they have been used in game research (in 2011)
Study II Theoretical A proposed model for interpreting results about
emotions
Study III Experiment 1 Phasic event-related physiological responses to different
opponents
Study IV Experiment 2 Tonic physiology and self-reports during competitive
and cooperative play (binary), different genders,
different locations
Experiment 3 Tonic physiology and self-reports during competitive
and cooperative play (four conditions), different
genders
Study V Experiment 4 How tonic physiology and self-reports predict actual
play and preferences
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type of presence of others and the role of participants, and the relationship
between participants, their gender, and the play environment. Each has
empirical evidence, ranging from convincing to tentative, for its significance,
but each also has important shortcomings to which this dissertation aims to
offer new insight.
First, the evidence both from physiological and self-report data on two
questions, the influence of type of presence of others, and the influence of the
relationship between the players, is rather strong: the experience is more
positive when played with a human, and less positive when played with a virtual
co-player (computer AI); and likely also more positive when played with a friend
vs. with a stranger. But almost all the studies have been tonic in nature (i.e.,
studying aggregate signals over the whole experience). The only exception,
studies by Mandryk and others (Mandryk, Inkpen, et al., 2006; Mandryk &
Atkins, 2007) that report time series data, were focused on the methodology
and did not analyze differences in phasic responsivity to the different types of
presence (local vs. virtual). That information is important for practical
purposes, for example when designing adaptive systems that react to the
changes in a user’s emotional state, but also when trying to understand the
mechanisms under which the game experience work. Study III (Kivikangas &
Ravaja, 2013), reporting Experiment 1, offers experimental data on the different
responses to events of victory and defeat—arguably the constitutive events
regarding any multiplayer game set up as a competition (cf. Salen &
Zimmerman, 2004)—when the opponent is a friend, a stranger, or an AI.
In addition to competitive games, there are cooperative games. Research
shows that competitive games are reported usually (but not always) more
positively. However, the only psychophysiological study (using only measures of
arousal) on the topic used rather contrived experimental conditions that raise
the question of ecological validity (a single encounter of trading or dueling
within a MMO game; Lim & Reeves, 2010). As the second empirical
contribution, Study IV (Kivikangas, Kätsyri, Järvelä, & Ravaja, 2014) reporting
results from two experiments, Experiments 2 and 3, investigates the self-
reported and physiological effects of the player roles (competitive or
cooperative), and furthermore, their interaction with the gender, as it appears to
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be of some significance. In addition, the effect of location is examined in
Experiment 2, and the comparison between local and virtual co-presence in
Experiment 3.
The third empirical contribution, Study V (Kivikangas, Järvelä, & Ravaja,
2015), reporting Experiment 4, shows the practical significance of the self-
reported and psychophysiological measurements in game context: their
predictive power in regard to future play and preferences. It is all good in the
academic world to find statistical differences between conditions, but for the
first time, there is also practical information on what they mean in the real
world.
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2. Methods
2.1. Theoretical contributions
2.1.1. Review of psychophysiological methods in game research (Study I)
The original work that Study I is based on was done in 2010, for a Digital Games
Research Association conference (DiGRA Nordic, August 16-17, 2010,
Stockholm, Sweden; Kivikangas et al., 2010), from which the best papers were
invited to be published in the special issue in Journal of Gaming and Virtual
Worlds. The searches (see below) were redone in 2011 to include any new
articles on the topic of the manuscript that eventually became Study I. Because
both of the articles were limited to a word count set by publisher, the review was
not exhaustive or systematic.
Study I gives a quick overview of the contemporary understanding of the
theory that the psychophysiological measurements were based on at the time,
and the practical use of the methods. The most important source was the
Handbook of Psychophysiology, 2nd edition (Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson,
2000a), with the chapter on emotion and motivation (Bradley, 2000) as the
main theoretical framework. The other major source was the review of
psychophysiological methods specifically in the context of media research
(including TV, newspaper, non-game computer use, and so on; Ravaja, 2004),
which provided further interpretation and recommendations of the use of
methods with more complex stimuli. Other measures than the ones used in this
dissertation (electromyography or EMG, electrodermal activity or EDA, and
heart rate or HR) were also overviewed, especially electroencephalography
(EEG).
Reviewing the empirical studies using psychophysiological measures in game
research, the articles were searched16 with Google Scholar by keyword “(digital
or video or computer or electronic) game(s)” with one of the following
keywords: “psychophysiology” or “psychophysiological”, or measure-specific
keywords such as “EMG” (or “electromyography”), “EDA” (or “electrodermal
activity”) or “SCL” (or “skin conductance level”), or “HR” (or “heart rate”). The
16 Unfortunately, the exact search terms or the search methods are not reported in the article, so this is
based on my, probably flawed, personal recollection. See limitations, section 4.2.
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resulting hits were further cleaned from articles that did not specifically study
digital games but, for instance, used a digital game to elicit stress during a
general psychological experiment. The remaining articles were classified
according to their apparent purpose, to validity studies, social game experience
studies, studies about game features, studies  about game events, studies about
the long-term game effects on the player, and studies using psychophysiology in
game design (or rather, development). Long-term game effects are only lightly
touched, as mostly those studies have a clearly different aim (finding out about
the negative effects of game violence, or about the positive effects, such as
learning) than the rest (how is the player affected at the moment of playing, and
its practicalities).
2.1.2. Theory development (Study II)
In Autumn 2014, during a personal grant for finishing this dissertation, I was
frustrated with the weak theoretical basis I had for emotions and their
relationship with the psychophysiological measurements. I began rereading the
emotion-theoretical literature I was already familiar with, but I quickly turned
to look for more recent studies. After looking for an integrated overview in the
chapters in Handbook of Emotions (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2008) to
no avail, I found the journal Emotion Review (http://emr.sagepub.com/) and
its long, edited special sections on various topics within the field of emotion
research by the most established current authors. Specifically the issue 2014,
6(4), entitled Four Perspectives on the Psychology of Emotion (Russell, 2014a),
confirmed that while there is no integrated theory of emotion, there are
important commonalities (Russell, 2014b); and while there are clear
differences, the problem (of the field) seems in many cases to be more in the
assumption of generality (i.e., that a specific theory is a general theory of
emotion, and not a theory about a specific part of the whole) than in
“correctness” of these theories (Nesse, 2014). Reading the special sections on
basic emotion theories (Russell et al., 2011), constructionist theories
(Cunningham, 2013), and appraisal theories (Moors et al., 2013), and the
current work of the dimensional theorists (Norman et al., 2011; P. J. Lang,
2014) helped me to conceptualize the current knowledge along the four main
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theory families—as well as to understand exactly what is the focus of these
theory families and how they might relate to each other.
In the end, the neuroscience of Panksepp (Panksepp & Watt, 2011) and
LeDoux (2014, 2012) convinced me of the basic neural circuitries that drive very
specific behavior changes in animals. Scherer’s (2013, 2009, 2001) suggestion of
a fixed order of appraisals—that must be somehow part of these neural
circuitries—made me realize that what is currently missing on the
neuroscientific side is the structure of how the “primary processes” (Panksepp’s
preferred term for what others call basic emotions) relate to each other: if
appraisals launch primary processes, then some primary processes are quicker
and less complicated (in terms of required processing) than others. When this
insight was combined with the constructionist critique from Russell (2003,
2009), it seems evident that the “hundred-year war” between constructionism
and basic emotions (Barrett, 2013; Lench et al., 2013) is about focus (and
generalizing the results of one’s own focus to the whole system): the universal
and automatic basic emotions and the variable, constructed emotions can
coexist, when the former are understood as the quick responses to
evolutionarily salient stimuli, and the latter as the later, more thoroughly
processed (conceptualized, contextualized, and culturally affected)
constructions. Finally, I found that LeDoux’s “global organismic states” and
Russell’s (2003) core affect are connected with the Evaluative Space Model
(Norman et al., 2011), which models the primary modes of emotional valence
and motivation—positivity/approach and negativity/avoid—that affect the
emotional processing on different physiological levels. Other, minor, influences
were the evolutionary approach by Tooby and Cosmides (2008) and Tracy
(2014), the neural view by Cunningham and others (2013), the case for modular
mind by Kurzban (2010), and the experiments for finding consciousness by
Dehaene (2014).
Study II (Kivikangas, in press) gives an overview to my synthesis of these
emotion theories. The detailed account of the connections between the theories,
the assumptions needed for the integration, and the implications could not fit
that manuscript nor this one, and are left for later publication (Kivikangas,
n.d.).
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2.2. Empirical contributions
2.2.1. Participants
Participants in all the experiments were young (age ranging from 18 to 34, mean
around 23 or 24) volunteers recruited by university mailing lists and (except in
Experiment 1) by advertisements on discussion forums of popular gaming
magazines in Finland. All participants were ethnic Finns and spoke Finnish as
their native language. To reduce the effects from differences in previous
experience and to ensure sufficient skills for all the participants to play the
game, each experiment was designed for participants already familiar with
gaming and the employed game genres, and in Study IV experiments, also the
particular games used, so suitable previous experience was a selection criterion
for the participants. This requirement also inadvertently affected the gender
balance of the participants in the both Study IV experiments, as the volunteers
were typically overwhelmingly male, and to obtain enough female participants
the recruitment emails had to be resent several times. Table 2 summarizes the
participants of the four experiments.
In Experiment 1 the research question—the effect of relationship to the
opponent, a friend or a stranger—was examined by employing participants in
groups of three same-gendered persons. Two of them were self-declared friends
(they were recruited together) and one was a person unknown to the others (i.e.,
a stranger, ensured from the other two before the experiment was started). One
Table 2. Summary of participants in the four experiments.
Experiment n Male/
female
Experiment
type
Notes
Experiment 1
(Study III)
33
(99)
17/16 single
measured
(dyad playing)
one participant chosen as the
main participant whose responses
were measured, who played
against the other two, separately
Experiment 2
(Study IV)
48 30/18 dyad
Experiment 3
(Study IV)
82 50/32 dyad
Experiment 4
(Study V)
36 36/0 single all-male sample
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of the two friends was randomly chosen as the main participant, and only this
main participant’s physiological signals were recorded in the experiment.
In both Study IV experiments the participants were recruited in same-gender
dyads. Cross-gender dyads (and cross-gender triads in Study I) were left out in
purpose, because with already small samples the statistical power would have
decreased to untenable level. The dyads volunteered together, so the
participants in each dyad knew each other before the experiment.
The nature of Study V, a follow-up study to make predictions about future
behavior and responses, did not require dyadic data, so participants were
recruited individually. Only males were employed, because based on previous
experiments, males were easier to recruit, and it was assumed that as the three-
week follow-up period would be more demanding than sole laboratory
experiments, it would be difficult to obtain sufficiently balanced samples of both
males and females.
2.2.2. Stimulus games and game-specific arrangements
As the digital game experience, including the emotions, is not solely a product of
the outcome of the game (i.e., win or loss), but also the rules of the game—
concretized in how the “game world” works and how the player can access and
manipulate it—and its audiovisual output, it is important to understand the
rudimentary facts about these in regard to games used in the experiments.
2.2.2.1. Experiment 1 (Study III)
The stimulus was a simple FPS game Duke Nukem Advance—an acclaimed
game on the GameBoy Advance hand console still popular at the time of
conducting the experiment. The game parodies action movies of the eighties
with crude cartoonish graphics and sounds. Both two-player and single-player
modes were played from the beginning of a predefined game map and continued
until eight minutes had passed, at which point the experimenter asked the
participant to pause the game and answer the questionnaires. The two-player
and single-player modes were not identical: whereas the two-player game was
played in a maze-like map where the only characters are the PCs and the
purpose is hunt down the other PC (depicted as a stereotypical muscular action
hero), the single-player mode employs a story mode with (the little) narrative
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running in text boxes and the less contrived map containing dozens of opposing
NPCs (depicted as anthropomorphic animals) on the way to the exit. The friend
and stranger conditions differed from each other only in respect to who was
playing the other PC. The participants played the game side by side, so the
players could communicate with each other—however, a separate study
suggested that co-location did not change the results in respect to non-co-
location (Ravaja, 2009).
The victory and defeat events were the same in two-player and single-player
modes: in victory, the opposing character collapses with a (cartoonish) blood
splatter and a scream when shot, and in defeat the screen goes red with a groan
and a text indicates that the player has lost, until the game resumes after a small
pause. The main differences between the modes were that there could be, and
often were, several NPCs in the same room at the same time, while this was
never possible in the two-player mode, but on the other hand that the AI was
much less difficult opponent than a human player. Due to these differences,
Study III does not make direct comparisons between the modes.
2.2.2.2. Experiment 2 (Study IV)
Experiment 2 employed a remake of a popular cartoonish arcade game,
Bomberman, on the PSP hand console. There are two to four characters in the
game, and we arranged four characters in teams of two. The goal of the game is
to eliminate characters belonging to opposing teams by moving in a small
abstract board, shown in its entirety, and drop bombs that explode after a small
delay, clearing the blocks and blasting out any characters (including the PC that
dropped the bomb) the explosion hits. One match normally takes from two to
five minutes. Within the eight-minute limit in our experiment the participants
had time to play from one to three matches.
The cooperative and competitive conditions were identical in respect to how
the game worked—the only difference was that the team arrangement was two
human players against two AI characters in cooperative, and each human player
with one AI character against the other team with the other human player and
one AI character in competitive condition. The AI in this game was not easily
distinguishable from human players due to the simple and abstract dynamics of
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the game, and could be even considered to be at the level of an experienced
player.
2.2.2.3. Experiment 3 (Study IV)
We had suspicions that the hectic action in the Experiment 2 game may have
masked some arousal effects, and that the game may have been more accessible
to males than to females. In addition, we wanted to include a separate condition
for a mix of competition and cooperation, and to control better the victories and
losses of the participants (that could not be easily recorded during Experiment
2), so the game was changed for the second experiment. Experiment 3 used a
simple abstract game, HedgeWars, which is an open-source clone of a popular
commercial game Worms (or more specifically, its sequel, Worms
Armageddon). The game is a cartoonish turn-based artillery game, where game
characters start from random locations in a landscape viewed from the side, and
the goal is to shoot opposing teams with ballistic weapons, either to blast them
to the water surrounding the landmass (which is also destroyed by each
explosion), or by decreasing their life points to zero with subsequent shots. Each
player controlled three characters, one per turn, and the (randomly ordered)
conditions determined the team arrangements. (1) In cooperation, the
participants played in the same team against an AI team (similar to competition
in Experiment 1). (2) In mixed cooperation and competition, the participants
played in the same team against an AI team, but at the same time they competed
within the team for higher score. (3) In competition, the participants were in
different teams with one AI “player” that had three characters (similar to
competition in Experiment 1). Finally, to investigate the effect of AI presence,
(4) competition without computer was a condition where the participants
played in different teams without the AI characters. There was no other
difference in how the game works. However, because the decisions made in
HedgeWars are much more complex than those made in Bomberman, the AI
characters’ behavior was markedly different from behavior by characters
controlled by human players.
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2.2.2.4. Experiment 4 (Study V)
We used four different games, but the experimental conditions did not
change within games, but between them, to find how the different emotional
experiences predicted future play and preferences. The chosen games all had
good Metacritic averages (http://www.metacritic.com, a site aggregating game
reviews from game journalists), but they were a bit older, to avoid limiting
potential participants with demanding technical requirements (as the games
were meant to run also on the participants’ own computers) and to avoid the
potential confounding effect of marketing campaigns. We used two games from
two popular genres, first-person shooters and adventure games. The FPSs were
Painkiller, a quick-paced unrealistic old-school shooter with vast masses of
enemies and powerful weapons, and Operation Flashpoint: Cold War Crisis, a
more realistic infantry soldier simulation. The adventure games were
Fahrenheit (known as Indigo Prophecy in the US), a cinematic supernatural
thriller with intense action sequences, and Sam and Max: Season One, a slow-
paced comedic point-and-click adventure.  In addition, in order to introduce
variability between the games despite their roughly equal quality, the aim was to
choose one to be more “light-hearted” (PK and SM) and one a more “hard-core”
(OF and FA) within the genre, although without any objective measure, this was
ultimately based on authors’ personal judgment.
2.2.3. Procedures and experimental conditions
Table 3 summarizes the examined factors and dependent measures in the
four experiments.
The procedures in all experiments followed the same basic steps. Beforehand,
the participants were asked to answer trait and background questionnaires. The
laboratory session began when the participants were brought in the observation
room outside the laboratory, and the participants were briefed on the purpose of
the particular experiment to the extent that did not reveal the exact focus—i.e.,
it was explained that the physiological measures are associated with emotions,
but it was not explicated which parts of the stimulus we expected to be related to
the changes in those emotions. The participants filled informed consent forms,
after which the participants were seated in the laboratory that was set up for
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comfortable game play. The electrodes were attached, the signals were tested,
and (except in Experiment 4) it was ensured that the participants knew the
controls and could play the game during short a practice session. Then, a brief
rest period (five to eight minutes) calmed the participants before the
experimental phase that contained the conditions detailed below. Finally, after
the experimental phase and while and after the electrodes were detached, the
participants were offered an opportunity to ask questions that could not be
asked beforehand, and when they were finished they were thanked and
compensated with movie tickets. In case of Experiment 4, the participants also
received some of the games employed in the experiment after the three weeks of
follow-up phase.
Study III investigated the effect of external social context on phasic emotional
responses to important game events. The external social context was
manipulated as the relationship between the players, and for this, the main
participant played the game in three 8-min conditions: once against the friend,
once against the stranger, and once against computer-controlled characters only
(in the single-player mode), in randomized order, with physiological measures
taken during the play and self-reports afterwards. The game play was video
recorded, and afterwards manually viewed and scored to pinpoint the important
events, victory (shooting the opponent character) and defeat (the PC getting
shot) events, within the data. As many of the events occurred so close to each
other that the events overlapped, only non-overlapping events were used to
Table 3. Summary of examined factors and dependent measures in the four experiments.
Experiment Examined factors and their levels Dependent measures
Experiment 1
(Study III)
Relationship to opponent: friend, stranger, AI
(Presence of AI opponent: yes, no)
Physiological emotional
responses
Experiment 2
(Study IV)
Mode: competition, cooperation
Gender: female, male
 Location: laboratory, home
Physiological and self-
reported emotional
responses
Experiment 3
( Study IV)
Mode: competition, cooperation, mixed
Gender: female, male
Presence of AI opponent: yes, no
Physiological and self-
reported emotional
responses
Experiment 4
(Study V)
Physiological and self-reported emotional
responses *
Play time & preferences
Note. * Emotional responses were not a categorical factor, but were instead modeled
individually as linear effects.
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ensure that the responses were not contaminated. However, data from
overlapping were compared to see if the overlapping events were very different
from the non-overlapping ones; they were not.
 Study IV investigated the effect of both internal and external social contexts
in both experiments. The internal context was the extent of
cooperativeness/competitiveness (mode), and the external context was the
gender of the players. Experiment 2 was set up as 2×2×2 design, which, in
addition to the mode (within-subject) and gender (between-subjects), controlled
another external context, the location (home or lab as a within-subject factor),
to find out whether the laboratory could be considered as an ecologically valid
measurement site. Each of the four within-subject conditions lasted again for
eight minutes after which the play was terminated. Experiment 3 repeated the
mode and gender factors (and removed the location factor), and added two new
conditions: one to test the mixed mode where the participants simultaneously
cooperated between each other while competing against the computer-
controlled characters, and another to control the effect of computer-controlled
characters by removing them altogether for a comparison. The conditions were
of variable length (from less than five to almost twenty minutes), as they lasted
for one match in the game, naturally varying. In both experiments physiological
measures were recorded during the play, and self-reports were collected after
each condition.
Study V switched the focus to finding out how the emotional responses, the
dependent measures in all the other experiments, are related to actual play
behavior afterwards, namely play time and preferences. The participants played
four different games in four conditions, half an hour each, after which they
freely chose any of the four games to play for another hour (they also could
change the game as they pleased; some participants did change the game once,
and nobody did it more than once). Once again, physiological measures were
taken during the play, and self-reports after each condition. After the laboratory
session, the participants were given the four games with them along with
custom-made software, and they could play the games in the following three
weeks follow-up phase as they wanted while the software recorded the play
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times. Finally, after three weeks, the participants answered questions of
preference.
2.2.4. Measures
2.2.4.1. Physiological measures
All experiments employed the same physiological measures that have been
commonly used to (ostensibly) index emotions within valence-arousal
framework. See discussion in section 3.1.
Facial EMG activity was recorded with surface electrodes from the left CS,
ZM, and OO muscle regions, as instructed by Tassinary and Cacioppo (2000).
EDA was recorded from the ring and little fingers of the participant’s
nondominant hand (Dawson et al., 2000); the fingers were chosen—instead of
the typical index and middle fingers—because they are not used when the
participant is playing a digital game with a game console or a personal
computer. ECG was also recorded (although not reported in Study V) primarily
to extract the heart rate. In addition, Experiment 2 reported results from
accelerometers located on chest and on the backside of the game console (used
also in Experiment 3, but discarded due to technical difficulties), representing
how much the participants moved themselves and how much they moved their
hands holding the game console during the game.
2.2.4.2. Self-report measures
All four experiments used self-report questionnaires, and the most important
ones of these were same in them all (see below); however, as the tonic responses
to the Experiment 1 were already reported elsewhere (Ravaja, Saari, Turpeinen,
et al., 2006), the self-reports—that are tonic by their nature—were not reported
again in Study I. Therefore the self-reports of the Experiments 2 thru 4 are
listed here.
Emotion questionnaires common to rest of the three experiments were Self-
Assessment Manikins, providing an assessment of valence and arousal on
separate scales that present simple pictures of smiling/frowning faces and active
bodies without verbal descriptions (P. J. Lang, 1980). Parts of the PANAS-X
(Watson et al., 1988), a likert-scale verbal questionnaire for discrete emotions
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and more general positive and negative affect, were used in both Study IV
experiments.
In addition to emotion questionnaires, Study IV experiments employed a
social presence questionnaire SPGQ (de Kort et al., 2007), and several other less
relevant questionnaires and individual items.
2.2.5. Analyses
Due to limitations set by the vast individual differences in physiological activity
levels and reactivity, psychophysiological experiments are commonly designed
as within-subject comparisons. This also places demands on the statistical
analyses, as the common ANOVAs cannot be used for repeated and multilevel
data that may also feature strong autocorrelations. Linear Mixed Models
(LMMs) that have the additional benefits of robustness to non-normally
distributed and randomly missing data—both important features when
analyzing physiological data—were used instead.
LMM is an extension of simple linear regression, with the ability to model
individual intercept and slope for each predictor variable, and with an in-built
account of the variance structures such as autocorrelation. After the predictor
and outcome variables have been processed and, as often is case with
physiological data, transformed to more normally distributed form, the data is
restructured into format where one row of data represents one data point (tonic
or phasic average), and the multilevel structure—which condition and
participant the data point is from—is identified with separate identifying
variables. LMM, as used in my studies and run in SPSS software, then needs the
repeated effect defined in terms of these identifying variables: typically this is a
product of participant and the condition numbered in the order it actually
occurred in the experiment, with the first-order autocorrelation covariance
structure defined for residuals (i.e., assumes that data points from one
participant are correlated the more the closer they are to each other, in a certain
formula).
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3. Results
3.1. Studies I & II
3.1.1. The current state (Study I)
Study I presents a review of psychophysiological methods in game research (in
2011 and earlier), their typical theoretical framework, and empirical studies and
results gained using said methods. Although the review, with its shortcomings,
was not exhaustive of all the published game studies using psychophysiology
until 2011, I assume that the articles included in the review are a representative
sample of such studies, and therefore can tell us about the general tendencies in
the field.
First, what can we say about the evidence for using psychophysiological
measures in game research? Looking at the first category, Study I lists 14
articles among the so-called validity studies. Although they all report pioneering
experiments that attempt to find out how psychophysiological measures can be
used in the context of digital games, they also wildly vary in the purpose
(creating automatic emotional adaptation or emotion classification systems,
empirical testing of hypotheses, methodological development), in measures they
use (EMG, EDA, cardiac measures, EEG, eye-tracking, fMRI, accelerometer,
controller pressure, respiration), and in games they use as a platform (from
custom created virtual environments to off-the-shelf games of sports, racing,
learning puzzle, survival horror, and children’s physical games, among others).
There is no building on the results of previous studies in a systematic manner,
so the evidence for validity relies on a rather random assortment of studies that
happen to conclude that the method is sound (also raising the concern about the
potential for publication bias; see Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011;
Ioannidis, 2005). It is not clear at all what we are actually measuring with these
measures, in this context.
Extending the scrutiny to other categories, it seems that the studies on social
game experience (as reviewed in section 1.1.2) and on immediate effects of game
events (and perhaps the effects of game audio) have several different
researchers focused on a rather limited set of factors building on previous
results. The convergence of these results makes it more likely that they are
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reliable, while the studies on methodology (“validity”) and game features seem
more isolated. (In addition, several studies creating categorization algorithms
for emotions, or dynamic adaptive difficulty systems, are reported and might
show a good consistency, but I am not expert on these topics.)
How about the theoretical basis regarding emotions? How much do the
authors appeal to theoretical justifications? Twenty-six of the reviewed articles
described some kind of an experimental study of an emotional experience (I
ignore the articles cited in the game effects and game design sections here, as
they clearly had different aims). Of those 26 articles, ten did not refer to any
emotional theoretical framework on which its view on emotion was based, using
terms like “emotion”, “arousal”, “fun”, “frustration”, and “positive affect”
without explaining them17. Among the sixteen remaining articles (including
several by my colleagues and me), a few (e.g., Mandryk & Atkins, 2007; Ravaja,
Saari, Turpeinen, et al., 2006; Lim & Reeves, 2010) briefly considered the
theoretical limitations of making inferences about emotions from physiological
data, but mostly the articles took the relationship between physiology and
emotion more or less for granted. Although the wordings in the articles (such as
“is associated with”) never imply a 100% correspondence, the lack of discussion
about the limitations of the cited models  (such as the picture viewing paradigm
in P. J. Lang, 1995, and by which assumptions it is extended to digital games)—
insomuch as there are references to models at all—suggests that that the
relationship between different measures and between the measures and
theoretical emotional concepts is generally considered as unproblematic. After
the review, new relevant papers have been published (such as Poels et al., 2012;
Martínez, Garbarino, & Yannakakis, 2011; Garner & Grimshaw, 2013), but the
situation does not seem to have changed: the measures’ correspondence to
theoretical constructs is not considered.
17   It should be noted that this is not an assessment of the quality of these papers. Most of the ten not
referring to any emotion theory were computer science studies that, for instance, attempted to create an
automatic classification algorithm for inferring an emotional state from the physiological input. Those
probably used the emotion terms in the context of some other field, of which I am not familiar with.
However, even in such a case, it seems like a shortcoming if a discrete emotion category defined as the goal
was determined by a self-report, without considering whether the report is valid or reliable—or without
considering any model how the two (the physiological state and the self-reported class) should be
theoretically linked.
One of the ten was my own manuscript, which became Study I. More on limitations, later.
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How about other game studies—perhaps psychophysiological studies are a
bad sample of all game research in regard to how they view emotions?  Most
game research outside psychophysiology, when it refers to emotions, uses media
research frameworks (see Fang et al., 2010, for a quick review), psychological
frameworks (such as Tamborini et al., 2010; or Bartsch, Vorderer, Mangold, &
Viehoff, 2008), or models specific to game research field (e.g., Sweetser &
Wyeth, 2005), and not emotion theories. While they may present some essential
understanding on some aspects of media or game experiences, their common
feature is that they are almost entirely conceptual, instead of created from
empirical research, and the little empirical research on the specific measures
they propose relies solely on self-report. As one of the main points of agreement
in the generally contentious field is that emotions manifest themselves in
several components, this seems a serious shortcoming.
In conclusion, it seems that there is both methodological and theoretical need
for a common framework that would determine the relationships between
emotional concepts, physiological measures, and self-report measures, and give
some ideas on how emotions could be measured in a digital game context. Next,
I aim to present just that.
3.1.2. Framework for emotions and (not) defining emotion (Study II)
Study II presents an overview on the Affect Channel Model of Evaluation
(ACME). ACME provides a conceptual tool to understand the formation and
construction of emotion—from a series of evaluations, to physiological
activation and higher-order contextualizing processes. Briefly, ACME is based
on the idea that certain evolutionarily (see Tooby & Cosmides, 2008) primal
evaluation processes (closely related to appraisals or stimulus evaluation checks
by Scherer, 2009, 2013) constantly evaluate the sensory input automatically and
nonconsciously, and when their signature activation patterns are matched, they
start response cascades by activating specific affect channels (or process
cascades; related to primary processes by Panksepp; see Panksepp & Biven,
2012). The activation of affect channels lead to, if not separately inhibited,
changes in the motivational state (or evaluative space, as described in, e.g.,
Norman et al., 2011, a model developed on the more familiar valence-arousal
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model; cf. Bradley & Lang, 2007), and finally in the emotional components in a
semi-fixed order (cf. LeDoux, 2012; P. J. Lang & Bradley, 2010). ACME posits
the existence of low-level neural modules that interact and form affect channels
(such as exploration, fear, anger, and lust, following Panksepp & Biven, 2012),
which drive the body towards a specific (but contextually modified) adaptive
behavior. It assumes the motivational state, which influences and is influenced
by the affect channels, regulating the general tendency to approach or avoid by
inhibiting or facilitating evaluations that produce responses of same valence. It
describes a priority order between the affect channels, based on the timing
studies that Scherer and others have done on the order of different appraisals
(e.g., Grandjean & Scherer, 2008; van Peer, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2014) and
argues for a structure that connects these empirically validated evaluations to
the neural modules. ACME is organized to (conceptual) processing levels
respective to the complexity of the processing required by the corresponding
evaluations: the quicker and evolutionarily earlier modules are more rigid, and
the more complex and flexible the evaluation, the slower and less automatic it
is. While the current version covers only the very first (both evolutionarily, and
temporally in response to a stimulus in a certain situation) evaluations and
responses, it assumes that the higher processes include many functionally
consistent modules, which might potentially include functions such as social
evaluations of coalitions, dominance hierarchies, emotional expressions,
reciprocity, and empathy (e.g., Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001; Rand,
Greene, & Nowak, 2012), all important for social context effects related to the
current topic. As an interesting detail, according to Panksepp, playing has been
evolved in mammals for learning social rules and skills (Panksepp & Biven,
2012, Chapter 10).
The model is called a model of evaluation instead of emotion, because—as
noted by Russell (2009)—the definition of emotion is ultimately arbitrary:
people call certain responses but not others as emotions, because of their
cultural status, not because they would be naturally different than some other
responses (see the argument against natural kinds: Barrett, 2013). As Lang
(1995) found, emotions are motivational—but there is little reason to rule out
other motivational states, such as hunger, pain, or vertigo, other than that we
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are accustomed to do so. By focusing on the neurophysiological function of
stimulus evaluation, there is no need to be mired in the useless controversies
over what is emotional and what is not (Russell, 2012). Therefore, “emotion” is
whatever we call emotion in common parlance, including emotions that
populate game experiences, such as enjoyment and frustration. Emotions are
produced by the evaluative system, and when we study emotions, we study how
the evaluative system functions and how they result in subjective feelings that
we sometimes label as emotions. Furthermore, emotions during game
experience are no different than other emotions. The earlier the evaluations are,
the more automatic they are, so that they occur before the higher processes can
evaluate the mediated game context as irrelevant for real-life survival (see A.
Lang, 2006). The later evaluations, on the other hand, are influenced by various
contextualization processes in any case, regardless of whether the
contextualization happens to be “this is a digital game” or “this is a team
meeting with my coworkers”.
3.1.3. Measuring emotion, a revisit
Regarding emotion measurements, the existing emotion theories do not provide
a clear answer, with reviews coming from different theory families ending up
with different conclusions (e.g., Mauss & Robinson, 2009, concluding that the
dimensional approach is more appropriate than the basic emotion approach,
while others recommending just the opposite; Lench et al., 2011). However, the
simplistic approach, like taking the correspondence of physiology and emotion
concepts (“ZM EMG = positive affect”) for granted can be considered clearly
wrong. This is aptly put in a conclusion for a review on naturalistic studies on
facial expressions (see Fernandez-Dols, 2013, for the whole Special Section on
facial expressions in regard to emotion; see also a review on smiling: LaFrance,
Hecht, & Paluck, 2003):
“[F]acial expressions cannot be defined as crisp, ‘true’ signals of an emotion,
but rather as fast, multiple, and imprecise cues which, nevertheless, are
adequate (adaptive) for their senders in a particular situation. A second, no
less reasonable conclusion is that such cues are linked to different mental
processes. For example, a single emotional episode might include
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simultaneous or successive facial movements linked to affective reactions,
appraisals, social motives, or strategies of regulation, but also to cognitive
processes or cultural conventions.” (Fernández-Dols & Crivelli, 2013, p. 27)
Systematically mapping out how the reality works is of course essential (see
especially the impressive review by Kreibig, 2010), but theory which helps
understanding the relationships between different factors influencing the
emotion components is better in that it provides explanations and testable
hypotheses that drive the research ahead. Although ACME is currently in its
infancy, I hope that in time it can be developed into a fruitful theory. For now, it
mostly remains a synthesis of previous work—from where we can work out
practical applications to current questions, for instance, using the appraisal
theories—and a bold suggestion to bind it all together, but already I attempt to
apply the grand view as an interpretative framework to the current topic.
In regard to the issue of convergence (or the lack thereof), ACME explains the
differences between self-report and physiological measures by the process that
produces them. The self-reports are always produced very late in the response
cascade, by high-level modules that after the activation has already gone
through complex contextualization and conceptualization processes. The
physiological responses are the more predictable the earlier they are mobilized.
The responses of all modules can be inhibited by conscious effort if the
individual anticipates a certain kind of stimulus, but otherwise, the earlier the
module, the more direct and consistent the physiological response. A startle
response (a reaction to a sudden and large change, such as a loud crash or an
object quickly approaching) is the earliest one, and the most consistent: the
physiological signals related to it can be used as a paradigm to investigate
processes that influence it (as P. J. Lang, 1995, shows). Similarly, evolutionarily
relevant stimuli that are hardwired to our brains (such as fear of darkness and
spiders, arousing quality of sexual cues, caretaking cues such as big eyes and
small bodies that make us go “aww”) produce rather reliable responses as
demonstrated by the picture viewing paradigm (Bradley, 2000) and in context
of other rather simple stimuli (short unambiguous audio clips and moving
pictures; see Ravaja, 2004). Unless the situation has been framed in an unusual
way, the correspondence between self-reports and the physiology is adequate, as
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the physiological responses are automatically launched and the higher processes
simply recognize them and thus may report them rather reliably.
However, the less evolutionarily primal the evaluation is, the more it is
influenced by the higher-order processes (such as those that contextualize the
situation for more complicated evaluation) that bring variation into the
physiological responses (by inhibiting hard-wired and replacing them by
learned responses) and into self-reporting. The two are not necessarily
coordinated, because the subjective and physiological components have evolved
for different purposes: the physiological mainly for mobilizing the body for
action, and the subjective consciousness mainly for accumulating information
from different sources and for sharing that information with others (Dehaene,
2014). The important caveat is that the physiological components is also to
some extent subject to processes that take care of social communication: for
example overt signals of shame are important for modules evaluating
trustworthiness (see Greene, 2014). It is likely that for instance the facial muscle
responses captured by EMG measurements result from some of the earliest and
most automatic social signaling processes, so that mostly, they work even when
nobody is watching. The question whether facial expressions are related to
emotions or social communication is old (Parkinson, 2005), and the current
wisdom stresses that both should be taken into account (Fernández-Dols &
Crivelli, 2013).
Using ACME, a preliminary list of expected relationships and the order in
which they should be easiest to measure can be drafted:
• As mentioned, the startle response is expected to be the most consistent
in physiological component and least affected by higher processes (and
thus the least variable in subjective reports as well); evolutionarily
relevant stimuli comes close second, to a somewhat lesser extent.
• Next, events directly related to immediate achieving goals or being
obstructed from achieving them. However, this is already confounded by
the processes that frame the situation in regard to various social and long-
term factors (such as self-image and social status; see also social
processes, below). The more immersed the player is, the less these
processes affect, and the more consistent should the measurements be.
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Yet, it should be noted that while negative response (e.g., frustration)
activates as a reaction to an obstruction, the positive responses (e.g.,
satisfaction?) in a digital game are probably much smaller, because they
would be less adaptive if they distracted from the action at the same time
as they reward it.
• Especially relevant to the game experience context is the exploration
channel, a rather early and automatic dopamine system-based circuitry
that includes the play module, responsible for playful behavior (much of
which can be conceptualized as following the principle of “predictable but
not too predictable”). The exploratory/playful behavior should be
accompanied by a low-to-medium level positive activation, which (in
absence of other strong activation) should be measurable with self-reports
and EDA (but not necessarily EMG, because the exploration is not a social
process by origin).
• Social processes, while clearly evolutionarily later adaptations, still
include many automatic modules that operate regardless of higher
processing (although of course, individual differences may be large). For
example, the evaluation of dominance hierarchies may be behind
competitive behavior, and strong adherence to them (competitiveness)
should increase the intensity of achieving goals or being obstructed from
achieving them. Coalitional evaluations, on the other hand, might inhibit
them: if the situation is framed as a together-doing with a friend, the
immediate goal should be having fun together rather than winning, so
responses to both victories and losses might be smaller than in a highly
competitive framing (although of course, both processes could be active at
the same time, resulting in interactions difficult to interpret). In all social
cases, the social display rules present a challenge, as it is difficult to
discern whether a particular expression was a response originating from
an affective evaluation or a social signaling process (cf. e.g., LaFrance et
al., 2003). Notably, the brain likely treats fictional characters to some
extent similarly to real social interaction situations (A. Lang, 2006).
As a rough guide, because the evaluative system is primarily an evolutionary
adaptation, the logic behind the structure of processes should follow from
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evolutionary psychology (cf. Kurzban, 2010). Similarly, a more early adaptation
is more likely more automatic one, so the less some phenomenon seems to be
under conscious control or can be influenced by conscious effort, the more likely
it should have reliable responses that can be measured.
3.2. Study III
Study III empirically investigated the phasic emotion-related physiological
responses to victory and defeat events in regard to the relationship to the
opponent. The main results are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Below, I also
overview the results using the above theoretical considerations as an
interpretative framework.
The original article reported that the victory event elicited a positive response
in the local co-presence conditions (Figure 5, top panels, comparing the two
grey lines), indicated by the inverse u-form of the ZM and OO EMG signals.
Contrary to hypothesis, the victory events when playing against a friend were
not experienced more positively than the same events when playing against a
stranger, but it was speculated that this may have been influenced by a ceiling
effect, that the response to a victory event against a friend was attenuated due to
overall positivity level being higher to begin with. Finally, the victory in the
virtual co-presence condition over an AI opponent was reported not to show a
positive response, which was interpreted that the single-player game, in
addition to being different in game structure from the two-player games, was
perhaps not very enjoyable to begin with (cf. the tonic results in Ravaja, Saari,
Turpeinen, et al., 2006).
The emotion interpretation of these results is not the only one, however, as—
considering the ACME framework—it is also possible that the smiles are simply
social displays in the presence of another (cf. LaFrance et al., 2003). However,
the similar results from earlier studies are highly concordant with the current
ones: a success in Monkey Ball (picking up a banana, which is the goal of the
game; Ravaja, Saari, Salminen, Laarni, & Kallinen, 2006) and Monkey Bowling
(knocking down pins; Ravaja et al., 2005) games elicit the same kind of reaction
in a single-player game. Furthermore, the one study whose results are different
(killing an enemy character in James Bond showed a decrease in ZM and OO
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EMG activity; Ravaja, Turpeinen, Saari, Puttonen, & Keltikangas-Järvinen,
2008) actually shows the same pattern as we have here for victory against an AI
opponent: my suspicion is that only these two events (a kill of an AI opponent in
James Bond and here) do not represent victories in the sense of achievement of
a goal, as the AI opponents are more like obstructions for proceeding in the
game than actual goals. When the opponent is a human, the situation changes
and the kill of the opponent character becomes a real goal.
When looking at the negative responses to victory events, responses inverse
to the positive responses were expected; however, it was found that the event
produced a CS EMG response when the opponent was a friend, suggesting a
negative emotional reaction, and no particular response when the opponent was
a stranger (Figure 5, bottom left panel). Assuming that this was not a chance
finding, three potential explanations were offered in the original article for this
intriguing result: the apprehension that the person regarded as close might not
Figure 5 (from Study III).  Killing the opponent character event as a function of opponent
type. Mean zygomaticus major (top left panel), orbicularis oculi (top right panel), and corrugator
supercilii  (bottom  left  panel)  electromyographic  (EMG)  activity,  and  mean  skin  conductance
level  (bottom  right  panel).  Second  1  occurs  before  the  event,  seconds  2-7  after.  Error  bars
represent standard errors.
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experience the situation positively while the feelings of the distant person would
not be cared for similarly; the possibility that the security of social closeness
might allow for stronger displays of negative emotion, implying that the
response was suppressed when playing against a stranger; and the evaluation
apprehension effect (produced by the knowledge that they were monitored) that
might be stronger when in presence of a friend. All these possibilities have their
strengths and problems, but in the end, the explanation might be much simpler
than that, when we remember that the assumption of a direct relationship
between CS EMG activity and negative affect is faulty. The signal might be an
index of frustration in many contexts, but in the presence of a friend, social
motives should be stronger than in the other two conditions, supporting the
interpretation that facial expressions are also influenced by social
communication processes. Smiling mouth with the furrowed brow could be
associated with a kind of determined pleasure when your efforts to beat a dear
rival bear fruit, something akin to schadenfreude or gloating. However, while in
research these feelings have been linked with envy (Cikara & Fiske, 2012), in
game research the corresponding emotion has been reported as genuinely
positive (see de Kort & IJsselsteijn, 2008, pp. 4–5), and it can be seen in the
good-natured teasing, boasting, and payback-mentality (see descriptions of
competition in Sherry et al., 2006; and Poels, Kort, & IJsselsteijn, 2007). The
notable difference is that emotion research has typically conceptualized
schadenfreude in the context of rivalry as serious competition of status (Cikara
& Fiske, 2012; Leach, Spears, & Manstead, 2015), not as good-natured rivalry
between friends. This difference would explain the result in the original article,
with the positive response from victory elicited by both stranger and friend as
an opponent, but the CS EMG response, arguably indicating this “friendly
schadenfreude” and not negative emotion per se, only elicited by the victory
over friend as it would be too risky to signal in the presence of a stranger. This
interpretation would also support the interpretation that the smiles during
victory are indicative of positive emotion after all, because one would
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presumably not gloat (even friendlily) if one was not actually enjoying the
victory.
Defeat events replicated the earlier results that losing elicits, regardless of the
opponent, an increase in ZM and OO EMG activity (Figure 6, top panels) and a
decrease in CS EMG activity (Figure 6, bottom left panel), ostensibly indicating
positive emotion. This same effect has been found several times in various
digital game studies (Ravaja et al., 2005; Ravaja, Saari, Salminen, et al., 2006;
Ravaja et al., 2008; van den Hoogen, Poels, IJsselsteijn, & de Kort, 2012), and
in at least one economic game (Ravaja et al., 2015). Offered explanations for the
counterintuitive EMG responses have included visual impressiveness and
excitingness (Ravaja et al., 2005), positive challenge or rewarding feeling of
surviving a symbolically dangerous situation (Ravaja, Saari, Salminen, et al.,
2006), transient relief from engagement (Ravaja et al., 2008), and challenge
feedback (van den Hoogen et al., 2012). In Study I, I also originally suggested
Figure 6 (from Study III). Death of own character event as a function of opponent type. Mean
zygomaticus major (top left panel), orbicularis oculi (top right panel), and corrugator supercilii
(bottom left panel) electromyographic (EMG) activity, and mean skin conductance level (bottom
right panel). Second 1 occurs before the event, seconds 2-7 after. Error bars represent standard
errors.
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the transient relief explanation.  Yet none of these suggestions can be applied to
the rather simple context of economic game, where the participant simply
chooses to cooperate or not cooperate, and depending on what the partner (in
this case, a virtually co-present representation of an AI) chose, either won
money or lost it. While getting the results might have been exciting (although
the low value of the prize, a couple of euros, suggests it was not), there is no
immersion in a virtual world, no dangerous situation, no engagement, no
challenge. Again, a more plausible explanation might be social communication
instead of emotion: smiling as a result of framing the situation as social, where
the response to a rather insignificant outcome of the competition is overcome by
the importance of showing ‘face’ in a situation that could otherwise be
interpreted as threatening (see Table 5 and intercorrelation between
competition and presence of others, in a review by LaFrance et al., 2003). By
smiling, the participants (most likely unconsciously and automatically) signal
that the competition was not important to them and that its results should not
affect others (i.e., trustworthiness cues; cf., Vigil, 2009; see also LaFrance et al.,
2003).
3.3. Study IV
Study IV, reporting Experiments II and III, investigated the self-reported and
physiological effects of the player roles (competitive or cooperative), their
interaction with the gender, the effect of location (in Experiment 2), and the
comparison between local and virtual co-presence (in Experiment 3). The main
results are illustrated in Figures 7 and 8.
In both experiments, and after controlling for various confounds,
competition was associated with higher ZM and OO EMG activity than
cooperation for males, but not for females (Figure 7, top panels; Figure 8); in
Experiment 2, self-reported joviality (the discrete emotion corresponding to
high arousal and positive valence in the used questionnaire) and valence
repeated this pattern (Figure 7, bottom panels). In Experiment 3, self-reports
did not differ between competition and cooperation, but further analyses
suggested that this was probably confounded by the higher responses to the
explicit announcement of the winner. In contrast, despite the cultural
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assumptions, females did not show higher EMG activity, nor did they report
higher joviality or valence, in cooperation. CS EMG activity and self-reported
fear, hostility, and (in Experiment 2 only) sadness did not vary across genders,
although there was a difference in fear and sadness between cooperation and
competition (fear being higher in competition, and sadness in cooperation, in
Experiment 2 only). Together, these results suggest a difference in positive
emotion between cooperation and competition, but for males only.
From the perspective of ACME framework, it is a problem that tonic
physiological measurements aggregate over all the responses across a long
period of time, because most likely the results are an amalgam of activity from
many different processes and inferences specifically related to one source are
suspect. This is problematic especially when comparing cooperation and
competition—one which can be interpreted as low- and other as high-threat in
regard to need to signal positivity.
Figure 7 (Study IV Figure 1). Gender differences in zygomaticus major (top left panel) and
orbicularis  oculi  (top  right)  EMG  activity,  both  associated  with  positive  emotion,  and  self-
reported pleasantness (bottom left)  and positive affect (bottom right),  across cooperative and
competitive modes (Experiment 2). The error bars represent standard errors.
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However, the convergence between physiological and self-report measures
suggest that probably at least part of the tonic EMG activity reflects (positive)
emotional processes. From the earlier studies, both Schmierbach and others
(2012) and Emmerich and Masuch (2013) have reported more self-reported
enjoyment or positive affect in competition. The former did not report that they
tested gender differences at all, but the latter explicitly reports that no gender
differences were found—although only in terms of statistical significance (a
practice often criticized, see Cumming, 2014; Kline, 2013), so whether there was
even a weak tendency is not known. Notably, the self-reports had markedly
weaker effects than the physiological signals in our sample as well, and the
study also notes that according to the relevant review, females should be smiling
more in a social signaling situation (LaFrance et al., 2003). Considering these
points, my interpretation is that the results can be plausibly considered to
indicate differences in emotions.
Interestingly, in both experiments the social presence self-reports showed
higher empathy and lower negative feelings in cooperative, compared to
competitive conditions (and psychological and behavioral involvement following
the empathy in Experiment 3 only)—the former showing the opposite and the
latter the similar patterns to positive emotions. This is contrary to what the SCF
would predict (as it assumes that social presence is experienced positively), but
Figure 8  (Study  IV,  Figure  3).  Gender  differences  in  zygomaticus  major  (left  panel)  and
orbicularis oculi (right panel) EMG activity, both associated with positive emotion, across the
four conditions representing different modes of competitiveness (Experiment 3). The error bars
represent standard errors.
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exactly the same finding that Emmerich and Masuch (2013) reported. Noting
that the negative feelings subscale includes items related to schadenfreude and
vengeance, the finding also supports the interpretation for Study III that some
amount of gloating and payback mentality in a friendly competition is not
experienced as negative but positive.
Results for arousal were conflicting, as the SCL did not show any effects in
either experiment, while HR was higher in competition for males in both
experiments, and self-reported arousal was higher in competition for males in
Experiment 2 only. Both Ravaja (2004) and Kreibig (2010) mention that HR, in
addition to arousal, is also associated with (active) positive emotions, which
may explain the discrepancy. Earlier studies are not much of a help, as one
(Schmierbach, 2010) reported higher arousal in competition for males while the
other (Velez et al., 2012) in turn reported the opposite result for mode but no
difference for gender. These results remain unclear.
As for the other context factor, the results indicated no difference between
home and laboratory in terms of employed measures, in Experiment 2. The
effect of virtual instead of local co-presence (in Experiment 3) was not present
in physiological measures (Figure 6), but self-reports suggested—regardless of
gender—lower joviality, valence, dominance, and arousal, and higher hostility,
but not fear, in the condition with the AI virtual presence, as compared to
playing without AI in the game. An examination of free comments suggested
that this might have been due to the unpredictability and uncontrollability of
the AI player. Regarding the theoretical background, appraisal theories name
predictability and controllability as important appraisals (Scherer, 2001;
Roseman, 2013), but their prediction is that low level of these factors should
result in fear—exactly the one self-reported emotion that was not affected.
ACME, in turn, links these evaluations as part of the goal-orientation channel,
which activates the anger channel, in accordance with the current results.
3.4. Study V
Study V investigated the practical significance of physiological and self-report
measures in predicting subsequent play behavior and preference. The study was
an extension to an earlier study by Poels and others which had made a claim
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that there might be a direct association between pleasure and short-term
playing behavior, and arousal and long-term playing behavior (Poels et al.,
2012). The study was based on the concept of hedonic consumption, of which
one interpretation basically says that people do not consume things only
because it is rational, but also (and sometimes only) because it somehow gives
us pleasure (Alba & Williams, 2013). However, it is not obvious that our
motivation to consume something would show so simply in the level of pleasure
(interpreted as positive valence unproblematically measured by self-reports and
psychophysiological methods). The literature on gaming motivations (are
competition, satisfaction of intrinsic needs, effectance, or the other constructs
really reducible to simple average valence?), questions about genre preferences
(would tragedy enthusiasts really show highest pleasure for tragedy?), and our
everyday experience pose challenges to this idea.
We created an almost identical experimental design and followed the same
methods as Poels and others, but we extended the analyses in respect to the
literature showing that positivity and negativity should be considered relatively
independent (e.g., Norris, Gollan, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2010). However, the
study still assumes an uncomplicated relationship between emotions and both
self-report and physiological measures. What is the plausibility of interpreting
the results as signals of emotions? Using tonic averages over long experimental
periods, it is clear that the variety of processes influencing the physiological
signals is significant. In addition, the games used in the experiment were more
complicated than what are typically used (e.g., in Studies III and IV): especially
the cinematic thriller game Fahrenheit and the comedy adventure Sam & Max,
but also the plot advanced by cinematic cutscenes in Painkiller and Operation
Flashpoint (although to smaller extent) rely on a narrative, which is a rather
abstract stimulus processed by evolutionarily much more late-developed brain
processes than simple achievement responses—suggesting that the separation of
physiological responses and subjective feelings may be considerable. On the
other hand, playing alone, the lack of direct social context should at least
decrease the likelihood of complications from social processing.
Interestingly, the descriptive statistics (Table 1 of Study V) still show a
surprisingly high correspondence between self-report and physiological data—
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and the expectations based on the nature of the games. The game highest in self-
reported pleasure (the comedy adventure Sam & Max) also showed the highest
mean ZM and OO EMG activities and the lowest CS EMG activity, while the
game with the lowest pleasure (the military FPS Operation Flashpoint) shows
the highest CS EMG activity (but no difference in ZM or OO EMG activities).
Self-reported arousal, on the other hand, corresponds with the maximum SCL
instead of the mean (lowest on Sam & Max). Because ACME currently does not
extend to how narratives are processed, there are no theoretical expectations
other than the possibility (but not necessity) of larger discrepancy between the
measures among the higher processes. These findings, however, lend the basic
credibility for interpreting physiological signals as at least partly associated to
emotion.
Study V found, first, that the characterization presented by Poels and others
was overgeneralized, as we found completely different predictive associations in
our sample. Obviously, the different games influenced the results, but this only
shows that the predictive power of the measures is not invariant of what kind of
games are used. Second, it was found that pleasure should not be considered as
a single bipolar dimension (valence) but instead as two relatively independent
dimensions with their own predictive power, in line with theories and further
evidence for the emotional interpretation. Particularly, related to a
straightforward but challenging military shooter both high positive and low
negative activity predicted play behavior, but related to a plot-based thriller
game, low positivity predicted play behavior (and negativity was not associated
with it at all). Third, the study found indications that more complex games may
be predicted by more complex emotions, such as meta-emotions (Bartsch,
Appel, & Storch, 2010)—as shown by the association between low positivity and
play behavior, which suggests that those who did not find the game particularly
positive played it more likely (cf. Andrade & Cohen, 2007), although this is
highly speculative. However, a similar finding was reported by Emmerich and
Masuch (2013), who noted that when given the choice, more participants chose
to play a game mode that was previously rated as less positive. Fourth, we
learned that the effect sizes of the predictions may be rather high (βs up to
almost .50 per SD), yet quite selective (only some game-outcome variables are
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predicted). In principle, the different types of games should elicit different
response patterns simply because the dominant evaluation processes during
them are different. For example, a humorous adventure game without any
reason to hurry cannot rely on intensification of emotional responses to
achieving or obstructing goals by exploiting (non-social) threat evaluations, as
presumably the more action-oriented games do (see Study II). However, the
extremely long tonic aggregation of signals makes this very difficult, as even
very different kinds of games vary in their content.
A further important contribution of this study was to report results in natural
units, demonstrating the practical significance of the findings. Showing that
both self-reports and physiological measures can be linked to intuitively
comprehensible effects (such as hours of play) with a tolerable confidence (as
estimated by confidence intervals; Cumming, 2014) makes the measures more
practically meaningful for readers outside of academia (such as from game
industry).
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4. General discussion
4.1. Overview of the results
The sociality characteristics framework was interpreted to present three social
context factors: the physical and digital features of the setting (including
laboratory vs home), the presence and the type of presence of others (including
local vs. virtual), and their relation to the player in the play situation (including
competition vs. cooperation) and outside it (including relationship to the
opponent, and gender). According to the SCF, the first of these factors was
assumed to determine the social affordances, which, in turn, determined the
sense of social presence, or how the presence of others was experienced.
While the framework presented the general relationships between the factors
and the outcomes, it did not present any specifics about what effects might be in
practice influencing the game experience. In this dissertation I have reviewed
the existing literature and organized the known results according to the
framework, so that we now have the information on some likely effects
practically operating within the framework. On the empirical side, this
dissertation has further contributed to this knowledge by presenting new
research results for some of the most important factors (see below). On the
theoretical side, this dissertation has overviewed the emotion theories and
critically reviewed the common measures in the field, to improve understanding
on what we mean by ‘emotions’ and what can be said about the measures, and
ultimately in order to improve understanding of the empirical results (our own
and of others). Furthermore, the new emotion-theoretical framework I
introduced can be adopted for a broader use in game research or outside it.
***
Study I reviewed the game research papers using psychophysiological
methods, and my results from analyzing the papers indicate that the general
awareness of the researchers in the field about the theoretical and empirical
justification of their methods is quite poor. Most often, it is taken for granted
that the physiological measures index emotions, without considering why or
how, or what emotions are. Next, introducing Study II and my synthesis of the
emotion theories, I presented the theoretical framework—called Affect Channel
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Model of Evaluation—that provides a new view on what emotions are, how self-
report and psychophysiological measures are related to them, and what kind of
emotional processes might be plausibly investigated in which kind of
circumstances. As a return to the methodological considerations, Study V
suggested that while self-report and physiological measures can predict future
playing behavior, the predictions cannot rely on simple linear effects related to
pleasure or arousal, and they cannot disregard the fact that the play of different
kinds of games are probably predicted by different measures.
Regarding the empirical studies, Experiments 1 (Study III), and 2 and 3
(Study IV) investigated the following social context effects related to the
sociality characteristics framework.
Relationship to opponent. Study III reported the phasic effects of the
relationship to opponent on the game experience. The earlier studies about the
relationship factor have not investigated the phasic responses to relevant events,
so these findings are pioneering in showing that the differences are not only on
tonic level, but extend to responses to individual events. The responses to a
victory plausibly represent positive emotions which were similar regardless of
whether the opponent was a friend or a stranger. This lack of difference is
contrary than what has been found earlier, but this might be explained by a
simple ceiling effect. In general, the positive emotion finding is similar to other
victory events in earlier studies.
Based on the new interpretative framework offered by ACME, I proposed that
the simultaneous CS EMG response (when the opponent was a friend) rather
points to an expression of a friendly schadenfreude or rivalry (an interpretation
that is supported by results of Study IV, below) than a negative emotion.
Although there are no relevant similar results in the earlier papers, the proposal
to interpret EMG responses in a wider context than simply direct signals on
emotion is novel.
Finally, we replicated the earlier findings of a ZM EMG response to defeat,
with new information that this apparently occurs regardless of opponent. But
again, the novel interpretation is that this is a simple social signal in a
potentially threatening situation. When considering the evidence, this is the
most logical explanation.
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Competition vs cooperation and Gender as a background variable.
Study IV, reporting results from two experiments, concluded that competition
was experienced more positively by males, but no difference between modes for
females. The convergence between different measures and with previous studies
suggests that even if social signaling processes are influencing the physiological
measures, the emotional processes are likely active as well. The results repeat
what has been found in earlier studies to a certain extent, but the total sample
size from the two experiments, the extensive control of confounding variables,
and the consideration of different theoretical explanations make the results
much more credible.
The arousal measures in Study IV were inconclusive, although there are
indications that the discrepancy between SCL and HR could be resolved if HR,
in this context, would be interpreted to be associated with positive emotion
rather than arousal.
Social presence. In Study IV, the social presence subscales for empathy
and involvement were found to be higher in cooperative modes rather than
competitive, but notably opposite to positive emotion measures. This is contrary
to what can be expected based on the SCF, but it is supported by at least one
earlier study.
Furthermore, the so-called negative feelings subscale (including items for
schadenfreude and vengeance) was higher in competitive modes, in line with
positive emotion measures, supporting the idea of friendly rivalry (and again
supported by an earlier study). Although mentioned several times in the game
research literature anecdotally, to my knowledge this is the first empirical
finding of this concept. In addition, in the field of emotion research the concept
does not seem to have been considered earlier.
Local vs. virtual co-presence. Study III reported the phasic responses to
essential events in relation to the opponent, although because the control of the
stimulus was not adequate, these results are merely conjectural. Similar to the
tonic results reported in earlier studies, the victory events were experienced
more positively when the opponent was a human (local co-presence) as
compared to the AI (virtual co-presence). Defeat events elicited a large ZM EMG
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response regardless of the opponent, but as explained above, this was most
likely not indicative of emotional processes.
Study IV compared the presence versus absence of AI in the competitive
condition of Experiment 3, and found that self-reports, but not physiological
measures, indicated higher positive and lower negative emotions during the
absence of AI. However here, also, the results are suspect, because the free
reports from the participants suggested that the behavior of the AI was
particularly unsatisfactory.
In total, the results on local vs virtual co-presence are in line with earlier
studies, but not particularly convincing due to methodological problems.
Laboratory vs home of one of the participants as environment.
Experiment 2 in Study IV tested the influence of environment (home vs.
laboratory), and reported that no differences were found as main effects or in
interaction with other variables. The earlier studies have been somewhat
conflicting, but the tendency has been that home is rated more positively (or less
negatively) than school, café, or mobile environment (public transportation). I
have no explanation for this discrepancy.
4.1.1. Interpreting the social context factors
Although the sociality characteristics framework helps in identifying the social
context factors and their effects, it falls short from presenting a testable model.
A model, drawing together all the knowledge and organizing it into a coherent
whole with defined relationships between the parts, would be enormously useful
in research, and it would also offer concrete benefits for game designers. The
SCF could not be that model because there was not enough knowledge about the
parts and relationships yet; I do not believe that the current knowledge is
enough even now, but we have taken steps into the right direction. Thus, the
following is not intended as such a model.
The rudimentary sketch of what such a model could be, shown in Figure 9, is
a conceptualization of my current understanding of the social context factors
and their effects on social game experience. As in the SCF, the physical and
digital setting features shape the social affordances, which filter the influence of
the presence of others on the social game experience: without social
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affordances, the presence of others cannot have any influence. The relationships
(in the physical world) and roles (in the digital world) in their own turn modify
the influence: if the person is annoying, the influence may be negative, while if
the person is a dear friend, it is likely strongly positive; similarly, if the roles in
the game force the interaction into a mold, such as competition by some
particular rules, the influence is modified according to the experiencer’s
preferences about that interaction (apparently, a male might consider
competition more positively).  The setting also determines the ways the others
can be present.
As can be seen in the figure, social presence is entirely missing from it.
According to the SCF, if my interpretation is correct, social presence would be
another filter along the influence arrow, limiting how the presence is perceived,
but at the same time influencing the experience by itself. However, in my
current understanding (and this comes with the disclaimer that I am not
familiar with the existing social presence literature), this conflates two different
functions that are for some reason binned under the common name of social
presence. In one hand, there is social awareness (close to what is called co-
presence in Biocca & Harms, 2003), simply the understanding of what the social
Figure 9. A rudimentary sketch of a possible model for mapping social context effects.
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situation with the other is—this could be depicted as the very tip of the influence
arrow in Figure 9. On the other hand, there is social involvement, which covers
the effects de Kort and IJsselsteijn (2008) discuss, such as empathy, behavioral
mimicry, and so on. But this is not the same process as the social awareness;
rather, I would place it inside the social game experience box. Where social
awareness is, in a way, a passive understanding at the situation, social
involvement is the active (although probably mainly unconscious) results of that
understanding in interaction with the experiencer’s personality, goals, attitudes,
and so on. In terms of ACME, social awareness is the evaluation, while the
involvement is the subjective feeling and the behavioral tendency resulting from
an affect channel that gets mobilized by the evaluation. This assessment of the
position of social presence is in part affected by the findings that social presence
(as it is now measured) certainly does not seem to act like it affects the influence
arrow, as I understand the SCF suggests—instead, it seems to be affected by it.
For example, it is easily imaginable that the awareness is high but the
involvement is low, such as in a case of an anxiety-inducing other, where the
high awareness leads to immobilization and withdrawal from the activity rather
than more engagement18.
In principle, the relationships between different parts could be examined
experimentally. For instance, it should be easy to diminish the effects of the
other person’s influence by varying what kind of communication affordances the
setting creates. Also, it should be interesting comparing different relationships
than simply friend and stranger—for example, relationships that have the
potential to modify the influence negatively, like the anxiety created by a person
higher in social hierarchy. Still, I offer the above conceptualization not as a final
product, but mainly as a discussion starter and a step in the research agenda to
investigate the social context effects more comprehensively.
18 Involvement could be interpreted as any kind of influence, also negative, which would dispute this
point. However, typically the involvement is considered to be positive engagement with the other, not
avoidance, as is shown by the assumptions that social presence is in itself a positive experience (de Kort &
IJsselsteijn, 2008).
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4.1.2. Interpreting emotions
In this dissertation I reviewed the use of emotions measures in game research,
and found that when emotion theories are cited, they are too often taken as
granted, and the caveats specifically laid out in those cited articles are often
ignored. Although I recognize the bother of reading or writing the same
disclaimers in every article that cites a particular model, it is important to
recognize the theoretical link of measures and the emotional concepts—to
understand exactly what can be inferred from the measures, what cannot, and
what are the grounds for doing so. Ignoring this link might lead to
misinterpreting the results, but also to giving a false idea to future (especially
junior) researchers.
ACME indicates that the closer the evaluated situation is to the evolutionary
survival-related stimuli, the more directly the physiological responses result
from it. A typical game content, while possibly containing some elements of
survival stimuli (such as darkness, startling surprises, or cute baby-like
characters), is rather far away from that and therefore may operate with a
somewhat different set of rules (see also A. Lang, 2006). The physiological
responses can be indicative of emotional processes, as I have interpreted in
parts of this work, but they should not be assumed so uncritically.
4.2. Limitations
4.2.1. Study I
As mentioned, Study I did not report the exact search words that were used, nor
could it (due to the word limit) report every relevant article. The classification
(that I already criticized for using such a badly chosen name as “validity”
studies) is rather baseless, and in many cases the overview on the papers seems
to paint an unjustifiably rosy picture about the state of the field. The focus, apart
from just listing the papers that have used a particular methodology in the
particular field, is unclear. Admittedly, that was the focus at the time because
there was confusion about what the “field” or its state exactly is, but with a bit
ambition, it could have been also something much more useful, making a larger
point in order to make future research better. In addition, some kind of quality
focus might have been in order, limiting out the least rigorous studies or the
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least plausible publication venues—currently, the source or its credibility is not
considered at all in the main text. (Thankfully, the predatory journals did not
exist yet to the extent that this would have been a major problem—now it is just
a matter of putting workshop working papers and quality journal publications in
the same bin.)
Although I use Study I here for demonstrating the lack of theoretical rigor in
the game research field, it itself is a prime example of a paper that does not
report properly the theoretical limitations that psychophysiological measures
face—and more than in a random article reporting an individual empirical
experiment, this is a serious flaw in a review that was intended as a common
reference material. There is a lack of theoretical depth, with discrete and
appraisal theories mentioned along the dimensional models, but the references
are twenty years old and are not contextualized in a big picture. Even more
serious for a review on methodology, there is also the lack of methodological
depth, uncritically repeating the typical connections, but not their limitations,
and the relevant alternative interpretations (such as the social communication
view) are touched only very lightly without really discussing them. To be fair, it
is commendable that even within the word limit, there is almost a page of
methodological considerations right in the beginning about the difficulty of
using digital games as experimental material and the importance of proper
experimental control.
Finally, the statistical rigor leaves much to hope for as well. The article does
mention the need for a suitable sample size (even in the face of the fact that
psychophysiological measures are extremely laborious and really satisfactory
sample sizes relative to the weakness of the target effect sizes are nearly never
acquired), but other considerations, such as the importance of using effect size
estimators, are not mentioned. In addition, the call for new, less broken
statistical methods and less inherently biased reporting practices has only
gained weight recently (see Kline, 2013; Cumming, 2014; Simmons et al., 2011)
so it is not a shortcoming that we were not able to see the future at the time, but
today, these points would be essential.
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All in all, Study I, like Study III, reflects the degree of my inexperience at the
time, which, I suppose, can be also seen as positive development that I now
know better.
4.2.2. Study II
In contrast to Study I, Study II represents the most current research I have to
offer, so I do not yet have the benefit of hindsight and accumulated knowledge
to assess the work itself critically.
Currently, ACME only considers (some of) the very first and quickest
response patterns to stimuli. The emotional components are influenced to large
extent also on higher levels, but without a clear theoretical source that would
have systematized their operation, I do not know enough to make even
preliminary suggestions of their integration.
Considering the enormity of the mission that Study II was set out for—
creating a synthesis of the known emotion research in order to make the whole
more accessible and conceivable—it is inevitable that I have missed some
essential articles that I do not know of or recognize yet. In this time, I could not
have even read everything that is available from the very key authors, Scherer,
Panksepp, Russell, and Cacioppo (and others). Due to the importance of
psychophysiological methods, perhaps Lang and other psychophysiologists
would have been equally important. It just happened to all click together with
the works that I have currently cited, that either there really is something to the
common basis of all these theories, or otherwise it all simply seems to fit
because I know so little about them.
I recognize that my knowledge in the relevant fields is lacking. Coming from
psychophysiological game research, there is a world of neuroscience and
emotion psychology that I am not aware of. An especially grave shortcoming is
that I know so little about evolutionary psychology: I am aware of the main
principles, but I do not know the methods and or have the understanding of
what is proper research on the field (as there are often-heard mentions of bad
evolutionary psychology). Even on my home turf, psychophysiology, I feel
hopelessly unlearned due to the need of having to spread my attention across
several multidisciplinary borders to be able to do game experience research.
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I fully acknowledge that it is entirely possible that the whole ambitious
creation that is ACME is ridiculously off the mark due to the fact that I simply
do not know enough to understand why. However, for overly critical readers I
wish to stress that the rather abstract theoretical vision that is Study II is not all
there is to ACME—I mentioned earlier my unpublished manuscript (Kivikangas,
n.d.). Originally I wrote this rather lengthy manuscript on the specifics of how
Panksepp’s, Scherer’s, LeDoux’s, Russell’s, and Cacioppo and others’ works
relate to each other at a much greater degree of detail than what is reported in
Study II. It remains until that manuscript is peer-reviewed that the real basis of
ACME gets tested.
4.2.3. Study III
Looking at Study III theoretically, the overly direct inference from physiological
responses to positive or negative affect is in principle unwarranted. However,
according to my interpretation of ACME, the events in question here—victory
and defeat—also happen to be prime examples of game events manifesting the
evaluations of achievement or obstruction of goals (based on goal-
conduciveness by Scherer, 2001). With this theoretical background, the
interpretation of physiological signals as indices of positive and negative affect
is not unreasonable (regardless of how I interpreted some results in the end).
Although no worse than a typical game experience study, naturally the
limitations of rather small sample size (both the number of participants and the
number of final non-overlapping events) and its representativeness, only one
stimulus game representing a very specific type of games, on one (now outdated
and less relevant) platform, apply. The generalizability to other people, other
games, and other game events may be questionable. Yet, the coherence of the
gained results with earlier studies with other people (although typically very
similar in demographics) and different games with a different content—
especially the positive response to a victory (cf. Ravaja, Saari, Salminen, et al.,
2006) and as mentioned earlier, the large ZM and OO EMG response to defeat
(e.g., Ravaja et al., 2008; van den Hoogen et al., 2012)—suggest that the results
are not idiosyncratic to this particular experiment. Of course, this does not
mean that the interpretations are the correct ones. A new study exploring the
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events should consider including appraisal measures to make sure that the
events are actually experienced as assumed.
4.2.4. Study IV
Study IV does acknowledge social processes as different interpretations for the
physiological signals, but there is still a degree of taking the measures for
granted. Again, though, the convergence with earlier studies lends credibility.
Two experiments investigating the same question give better evidence than
one, but the difference between the experiments could have been controlled
better. Although the main results for EMGs are the same, it is possible that the
confusion concerning arousal originates from how different the two games are.
In total, the sample size was adequate, but individually, the samples and the
gender ratios in experiments investigating a gender difference (30:18 and 50:32
of male:female in Experiments 2 and 3, respectively) were more skewed than
one could hope for. Particularly, the number of females in Experiment 2 was
clearly too low—especially as the games were played in dyads, which creates a
dependence in the data. However, this reflects the fact that recruitment of
female participants of equal previous gaming experience than males is difficult
or impossible. Here also we had considerable differences in gaming experience,
and though statistical techniques can be used to circumvent the problem, it
introduces a difference in the sample that might influence the results.
Statistically (and this applies also to Study III, and to a slightly lesser extent,
to Study V), the analyses and reporting should use methods more in line with
current recommendations (e.g., effect size estimations and confidence intervals;
Cumming, 2014) in order to better assess the plausibility and practical
significance of the results. Furthermore, in hindsight I am a little concerned
about whether I might have unconsciously exploited the flexibilities in analyses
and reporting to create a better story (Simmons et al., 2011), and how that may
have influenced the quality of my science. In our funding scheme, it is not really
feasible to follow the prototypical path of creating hypotheses from theory and
testing them (and only them) in an experiment. In practice, experiments have
been most often designed to overextend significantly from the original research
questions, because what the funding is for is not always the scientifically most
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interesting topic—for example, the experiments in Study IV were not designed
originally to study gender differences. Yet, collecting hoards of data and later
ending up to analyzing and reporting some parts of them does create a large
possibility for false positive psychology, which Simmons criticizes and which is
currently debated as a crisis of the whole psychology as science.
4.2.5. Study V
As a practical example of the problems of how experiments are practically
designed and what are the final end results, Study V was originally designed
together with the Poels et al. study it is now written to answer, in a project
where both of us collaborated. Due to practicalities of publishing studies, they
happened to publish their results first. In an alternative that was completely
possible, we might have published first, and they would have then written their
paper to answer ours, as if it was designed to do just that. Not only is it a poor
feature of the current publishing system that the mere order of publishing
changes the narrative the studies are framed with, but in the worst case, it also
skews the results. I might argue that in our case it actually improved the quality
of our manuscript, because seeing the other study first allowed me to think
critically and improve those parts (mainly analyses) that I still could.
For the stated purpose of Study V, the design is lacking. A direct replication
with the same games (but with the more nuanced analyses included in Study V)
could have examined whether the found associations hold, which would have
given much better understanding of the effects. As we could not choose the
games according to knowledge we only had after reading the Poels study, the
choices seem somewhat suboptimal. To specifically test the conclusions of Poels
et al. (2012), a systematic experiment could have been conducted by choosing
the games so that the measurable pleasure and arousal would have been varied
in a 2x2 factorial way, while finding participants to four groups so that each
group’s preferences would have varied by game genre (regardless of pleasure
and arousal). If my suspicions are correct, the results could have been that
different groups would have played their preferred game genres rather than
those that would have had the highest pleasure and arousal. Of course, this
setup assumes that measurable pleasure and arousal can be actually
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predetermined which would have needed some pre-screening, but I would
expect it is possible to some extent (e.g., intense horror for high arousal, a
comedy game for high positive valence, etc.).
In regard to the games picked for the study, some of them (particularly
Fahrenheit and Sam & Max) for the first time included game characters that are
observed as actors in a narrative, and interacted with in a social context. This
raises the question about interpreting the facial EMG results, as even a virtual
character might be considered a social actor making the automatic evaluations
activate social signalling processes (e.g., Weyers, Mühlberger, Hefele, & Pauli,
2006; A. Lang, 2006). As it is difficult to find out what kind of virtual social
situations the participants have encountered and how have these influenced the
total average of EMG measures, it is impossible to assess the extent of this
effect.
An obvious shortcoming in regard to this dissertation is that Study V only
used single-player games. A comparison of single-player and social games
would have provided a valuable addition to the current work.
4.3. Practical implications and future directions
The practical implications of my work can be relevant in academia, in game
industry, and in the society in large. In game research, the social context factors
should be studied further, in which case the current results provide evidence for
future research endeavors. More often, though, social context factors act as
confounds when studying other parts of the game experience, or other effects of
playing digital games. In these cases the understanding of potential sources of
error to the data is important, and the researchers can benefit from the current
empirical results, and from my conceptualizations when the empirical results
are lacking but some kind of understanding would be helpful.
A specific interesting finding was the empirical evidence of schadenfreude
related to friendly rivalry, which seemed to be a new idea to the emotion
research that has considered schadenfreude primarily as a negative emotion
related to envy (Leach et al., 2015). One possibility is that this could be related
to the difference between voluntarily engaged competition (playing games for
fun, see intrinsic motivation; Ryan & Deci, 2000) and a forced competition such
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as competition in a job market: in the former, the goal is to have fun, so losing is
not a threat but simply part of the activity, while in the latter, winning is the
goal and losing means that the goal cannot be achieved, resulting in negative
emotions (see appraisals, e.g., Roseman, 2013). However, voluntary engaged
competitions can result in similar negative emotions as well, such as in
committed supporters of sports teams (e.g., Kerr, Wilson, Nakamura, & Sudo,
2005). The other option, inspired by appraisal theories, could be that the
relevant difference is in whether the competitors are considered as one’s
ingroup and therefore not as a threat, or as one’s outgroup and potentially
threatening for one’s goals and needs. This is only speculation, though, as the
topic is not my expertise.
In the game industry, the knowledge of both phasic responses to certain
events (and the conceptualization of why these events are important) and tonic
levels of activity in certain broader conditions can be useful. For example,
recently the game industry has introduced free-to-play games that have a
different kind of revenue generation model, which also creates a completely new
game experience by constantly involving real money within play. Only a small
portion of companies have managed to utilize this to create games worth playing
that simultaneously bring in unprecedented amount of money; the vast majority
stumble because they do not understand how to make the relationship between
paying and playing both profitable and enjoyable. Detailed knowledge on the
moment-to-moment playing experience and paying experience would likely be
an enormous help. In this sense, the work of mapping the effects of context
factors (e.g., what is the influence of co-players regarding how socially present
they are in the game, where the game is played, state and traits of the player) in
relation to game experience—and how that experience is used so that both the
player and the game’s creators are happy—is just a beginning. In addition, the
research like the one presented here, pioneering in prediction of play behavior
based on game experience, is another crucial piece in this puzzle.
The evidence that there may be differences in game experience between
genders is significant in a broader context of gaming culture and questions of
equality. Currently, there is a lot of discussion how women are marginalized in
the gaming culture, but also in the contents of games themselves.
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Acknowledging that the results are tentative (only one study in addition to mine
has reported gender differences in regard to competition and/or cooperation:
Schmierbach, 2010; the differences are well established in behavioral
economics, but without considering the difference between voluntary and
involuntary competition; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2008; Andersen, Ertac,
Gneezy, List, & Maximiano, 2010) and reminding possible non-scientifically
oriented readers that they are statistical (they tell very little about the
tendencies of an individual), studies about gender differences in game
experience might show one way to help finding the features in games that
contribute to the marginalization. I do not suggest simplistically that “girls
should be made more cooperative games” per se without better evidence—it is
very much possible that the differences in emotions, even if they are
characteristic for females, do not translate directly to playing preferences (see
Study V, in which we found just that). But I do call for more research that could
explore what kind of features are strongly dispreferred by female players. For
instance, Hartmann and Klimmt (2006) reported that, unsurprisingly, sexual
gender stereotypes make young women dislike gaming, but that the most
relevant factor was lack of meaningful social interaction—that is, the lack of
social context, or the lack of right kind of social context (cf. Kuznekoff & Rose,
2012, who reported that a female received three times as much harassment in a
multiplayer game played over internet)—followed by violent content (see also
Terlecki et al., 2010).
Other context factors may have larger implications for the society, but the
one obviously important for games is the level of co-presence, which was only
superficially touched in this work. It is hardly any news anymore that a
multiplayer game is experienced as more positive than a single-player game
(although the fact that this difference is also present at the level of phasic
physiological responses is not previously known). However, the context factors
that influence this are very poorly known. What, exactly, makes a multiplayer
game a more positive experience? Many people, on the other hand, explicitly do
not like multiplayer games—why? Some of these factors have been already
discussed—whether it’s competitive, cooperative, or something in between; the
number of players; the roles within the game (is everyone the same in regard to
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in-game capabilities or are there systematic differences, such as character
classes? Is someone more powerful than others, and why?)—but to my
knowledge there is no systematic review of all the different factors. The research
question I am proposing is enormous in the sheer volume, but only systematic
work and widespread collaboration can tackle these kinds of fundamental
issues. My work here was a mere scratch on the surface, attempting to cover a
couple of central questions.
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